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I. INTRODUCTION
“An  individual 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make
a  will.”1 This provision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which reflects
the longstanding laws of nearly all American jurisdictions,2 does two things.
First, it grants all competent adults testamentary capacity. Second, it categorically prohibits minors from distributing their property through wills.3 The
UPC and the laws of all states simply deny children testamentary capacity.
Because this rule conflicts with the primary objective of the law of wills,
which is to allow people to freely choose how their estates will be distributed,4 it should be founded upon a coherent and compelling policy rationale.
Nonetheless, it is not.
Despite the tradition and ubiquity of the testamentary incapacity of minors, case law and legal scholarship devote little attention to   the   rule’s   ra-
tionale.5 Likewise, although the rule has appeared in the UPC since its original promulgation in 1969, the drafters of the UPC have not questioned the
rule’s  underlying  justification.6 Moreover, the few authorities that do discuss
1. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010).
2. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 141 n.1 (7th ed.

2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.2
(2003); see also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 19 of
2014 Reg.Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN 5/4-1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-628 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 95 and Statewide Issue 1 of
the 130th GA (2013-2014)). The two exceptions are Georgia and Louisiana. GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-4-10 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (authorizing children age fourteen and older to execute a will); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1476 (Wes, Westlaw Current through the 2013 Regular Session) (authorizing children
age sixteen and older to execute a will).
3. See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive
and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL’Y 275,  320  (2006)  (“Testamentary  capacity  is  based,  in  part,  on  the  age  of  
the testator. A minor is deemed not to have the capacity to make a valid will or to
otherwise  make  a  testamentary  designation.”).
4. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out
of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 883-85 (2012).
5. See infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text.
6. The comments to the section of the UPC dealing with testamentary capacity
makes no mention of the rationale of denying minor the ability to execution wills.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 cmt. (1990, as amended 2010). Moreover, the transcripts of the Uniform Law Commission meetings that reference the age requirement
for  executing  wills  contain  no  discussion  of  the  rule’s  underlying  rationale.    See, e.g.,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Probate
Code, Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, July 30, 1968, at 111-12; National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Probate Code, Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, August 2, 1969, at 134-35; National Con-

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321200

File:Glover – Final Edits

2014]

Created on: 6/11/2014 8:57:00 PM

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OF MINORS

Last Printed: 6/11/2014 8:59:00 PM

71

the  rule’s  rationale  do  not  satisfactorily  explain  the  categorical  incapacity  of  
minors.7 These authorities describe the rule as serving a protective policy,
which portrays minors as too inexperienced to make considered choices
and too young to be held accountable for their imprudent decisions.8 However, because this justification mirrors the rationales of minor incapacity rules
in other areas of law, it ignores the unique circumstances of testamentary
decision-making.9
Consider, for example, the need to protect children from their unwise
choices when assenting to contracts or giving gifts. Absent a minor incapacity doctrine, children would experience the potentially devastating ramifications of their irresponsible contractual and donative decisions.10 Incapacity
rules in these contexts safeguard children from squandering their resources by
limiting their abilities to give gifts and enter into contracts.11 By contrast,
minors do not need the same protection in the context of testamentary giftgiving because they would not suffer the consequences of their haphazard
testamentary   decisions.      A   will   only   becomes   effective   upon   the   testator’s  
death,12 and therefore the very nature of testamentary decision-making forecloses the possibility that children will experience the negative effects of their
poor choices. Certainly, minors could make foolish testamentary decisions,
but because they would not suffer the consequences of these decisions, the
need for protection is diminished.
The distinction between wills, which become effective upon death, and
contracts or gifts, which are effective during life, illustrates the need for a
critical reexamination of the minor incapacity doctrine in the law of wills. By
analyzing three potential explanations for the testamentary incapacity of minors,  this  Article  seeks  to  establish  a  coherent  connection  between  the  rule’s  
underlying policy and its mechanics. These potential rationales include the
traditional justification and two alternative explanations.
First, as traditionally explained, the age requirement could represent a
categorical capacity threshold that is aimed at protecting children from suffering the consequences of improvident testamentary decisions.13 Second, the
age requirement could be seen as a proxy for the minimum mental competenference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Probate Code, Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, August 5, 1969 (evening), at B106-07.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative
Reform:  An  Examination  of  the  New  Uniform  Probate  Code  “Harmless  Error”  Rule  
and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, the Rite of
Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L.
REV.  167,  176  (1991)  (“A  will  has  literally  no  effect  until  the  maker  is  dead.”).
13. See infra Part III.
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cy that the law requires of all testators.14 Under this rationale, the age requirement   aids   courts   in   making   a   determination   of   whether   the   testator’s  
mental capacity reaches the requisite level for valid will-execution. Finally,
the age requirement could implement forced parental inheritance, pursuant to
which the estates of minors are funneled into intestacy and are distributed to
the  minors’  parents.15
A critical examination of the traditional justification of the testamentary
incapacity of minors and the identification of alternative rationales has important implications. Specifically, the analysis suggests that, regardless of
which   rationale   explains  the   doctrine’s  place  in   the law of wills, lawmakers
should reexamine their minor incapacity rules and implement reforms so that
the rule adequately serves its intended purpose. Indeed, regardless of whether
a minimum age requirement furthers a protective policy, serves as a proxy for
competency, or implements forced parental inheritance, reform of the minor
incapacity rules in the law of wills is needed. By recognizing this need and
proposing specific reforms, this Article fills an analytical void that has been
left unaddressed by both trusts and estates scholars and those who study minor incapacity rules generally.
This Article proceeds in five main parts. Part II provides the context for
examining different rationales for the testamentary incapacity of minors. In
particular, it  explains  the  doctrine’s  place  in  the  law  of  wills  and  describes  the  
minor incapacity rules in the related areas of contracts and lifetime gifts.
Parts III through V analyze three rationales for the testamentary incapacity of
minors. Part III reexamines the traditional explanation, which views the age
requirement as furthering a protective policy. Part IV suggests an alternative
rationale, namely that age serves as a proxy for competence, and Part V analyzes a second alternative, which suggests that the testamentary incapacity of
minors implements forced parental inheritance. Finally, Part VI suggests
reforms of the rules governing the testamentary capacity of minors. Specifically, Part VI proposes that the categorical age restriction should be abolished
or, alternatively, that the law should grant minors testamentary capacity when
parents authorize their children to execute wills.

II. THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF MINORS
Before the various rationales for the testamentary incapacity of minors
can be examined, the  rule’s  place  in  the  law  of  wills  must  be  established.    An  
understanding of the relationship between the testamentary age requirement
and other capacity rules in the law of wills provides the context in which to
critically examine the categorical incapacity of minors. Further aiding the
analysis is the relationship between the incapacity of minors in the law of
wills and the corresponding capacity rules in other areas of law, specifically
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
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in the law of contracts and the law of lifetime gifts. A comparison of the
rules in these related areas illuminates the disconnect between the possible
rationales for the testamentary incapacity of minors and the mechanics of the
rule as it currently exists.

A. Testamentary Capacity
To validly execute a will, a testator must have testamentary capacity,16 a
requirement that contains two components.17 First, the testator must have the
mental capacity to execute a will.18 Just as those who marry19 or enter into
contractual relationships must possess a certain level of competency,20 those
who wish to dispose of their property through wills must also satisfy a mental
capacity requirement.21 Second, the testator must have the legal capacity to
execute a will.22 This requirement denies certain categories of individuals the
ability to execute wills, regardless of whether they satisfy the minimum mental capacity requirement.23 Although the law of wills traditionally denied
several categories of individuals testamentary capacity, today only minors are
categorically incapable of executing wills.24

16. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010); Adam J. Hirsch,
Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2220 (2011).
17. See JOHN T. GAUBATZ ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS 146-47   (1989)   (explaining   that   “‘[c]apacity’   in   this   context   has   two  
meanings,”  which  include  “the  testator’s  legal  capacity  under  the  local  statutes  regu-
lating  who  may  make  wills”  and  “the  testator’s  mental  state”).
18. Id. at 147.
19. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 146   (explaining   that   “[l]egal
capacity to make a will requires a greater mental competency than is required
for  marriage”).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1) (1981) (explaining that
to enter into a non-voidable  contract  a  person  must  be  “[]able  to  understand  in  a  rea-
sonable  manner  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  transaction”).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1(a) (2003)  (“A  person  must  have  mental  capacity   in  order  to  make  or  revoke   a  
donative   transfer.”);;   DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 141 (explaining that   “[i]n  
the   law   of   wills,   the   requirements   for   mental   capacity   are   minimal.”);; Bradley E.S.
Fogel, The Completely Insane Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of Monomania on
Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 67, 72-82 (2007).
22. GAUBATZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 146.
23. See id. at 146-47.
24. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient”   Capacity:   The  
Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 30607 (2006).

File: Glover – Final Edits

74

Created on: 6/11/2014 8:57:00 PM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/11/2014 8:59:00 PM

[Vol. 79

1. Mental Capacity
To validly execute a will, the testator must possess a minimum level of
mental competency.25 As the UPC illustrates, this requirement typically
mandates  that  a  testator  be  of  “sound  mind”  at  the  time  he  executes  a  will. 26
The Restatement (Third) of Property explains that, to satisfy this mental capacity  requirement,  “the  testator  .  .  .  must  be  capable of knowing and understanding in a general way [(1)] the nature and extent of his or her property,
[(2)] the natural objects of his or her bounty, and [(3)] the disposition that he
or she is making of that property. . . .”27 Furthermore, the testator “must  .  .  .  
be capable of relating these elements to one another and forming an orderly
desire   regarding   the   disposition   of   the   property.”28 Put simply, to validly
execute a will, the testator must be capable of understanding what he owns,
who his family is, and how the will disposes of his property. In most states, a
testator is presumed to possess this requisite level of competency.29 Pursuant
to such an approach, once a duly executed will is submitted to the probate
court, the contestants of the will have the burden of establishing that the testator lacked the required mental capacity.30
Two primary rationales underlie the mental capacity requirement. First,
the requirement ensures that a will reflects testamentary intent.31 If a decedent was unable to understand the decisions that he was making at the time of
will-execution, the document should not be considered a valid will because
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010); see, e.g., COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-501 (West, Westlaw through through laws effective May 2,
2014) (“An  individual  eighteen  or  more  years  of  age  who  is  of  sound  mind  may  make  
a   will.”);; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg.
Sess., eff. through April 8, 2014) (“Any  person  of  sound  mind  eighteen  (18)  years  or  
older   may   make   a   will.”);;   WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-101 (West, Westlaw through the
2013 General Session) (“Any  person  of  legal  age  and  sound  mind  may  make  a  will.”);
Pyle   v.   Sayers,   34   S.W.3d   786,   789   (Ark.   Ct.   App.   2000)   (“Every   person   of   sound  
mind and disposing memory has the untrammeled right to dispose of his or her property  by  will  as  he  or  she  pleases.”).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.1(b) (2003).
28. Id.
29. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 165. In a minority of states, the
proponent of the will must establish the mental capacity of the testator. See id.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. f (2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-407 (1990, as amended 2010).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§   8.1   cmt.  b   (2003)   (“The   law   of  donative   transfers   is   premised   upon   implementing  
the  donor’s  intent.   The law requires that the donor have the mental capacity to form
such  an  intent.”);;  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 147-48 (“[T]he requirement of
mental capacity assures a sane person that the disposition he desires will be carried
out  even  if  he  later  becomes  insane  and  makes  another  will.”).
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the decedent did not make a rational decision to dispose of his property.32
Second, the mental capacity requirement serves a family protection function.33 By requiring that the testator possess a minimum level of mental competency,  the  law  protects  the  testator’s  family  from  irrational  disinheritance.34

2. Legal Capacity
Even if a decedent satisfied the mental competency requirement at the
time of will-execution, the attempted exercise of testamentary power is
valid only if he also possessed the legal capacity to execute a will.35 To satisfy this requirement, the decedent must not fall within certain categories of
individuals that necessarily lack the ability to execute wills regardless
of whether they satisfy the mental competency requirement.36 For example,
under the early common law, a married woman inherently lacked the legal
ability to convey real property via testamentary disposition and could only
dispose of personal property through the terms of a will if she had the consent
of her husband.37 These restrictions did not depend upon the competency of
32. See STEWART E. STERK, MELANIE B. LESLIE & JOEL C. DOBRIS, ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 99 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that one justification for requiring testamentary
capacity  is  that  the  law  should  reflect  only  the  testator’s  “true”  intentions).
33. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 146 (“[T]he law . . . requires mental
capacity  to  protect  the  decedent’s  family.”);;  Pamela  Champine,  Expertise and Instinct
in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 49 (2006) (explaining  that  “[o]ne  view  posits  that  the  best  way  to  assure  that  the  testator  had  the  capability to  exercise  sound  judgment  is  to  examine  the  content  of  the  will  that  the  testator’s  
judgment   produced”   and   further   explaining   that   “[t]his   view is associated with the
policy  of  protecting  the  testator’s  family . . . because it is the closest family members
who  most  typically  will  benefit  from  a  successful  will  contest.”).
34. See STERK, LESLIE & DOBRIS, supra note 32, at 425 (“Another justification
for requiring capacity rests on the notion that family members may be entitled to an
inheritance . . . because they have developed expectation about inheritance which
ought not to be disappointed unless testator has a rational basis for disinheriting
them.”).      Other   rationales   may   also   explain   the   mental   capacity   requirement.      For  
example,  “the  public  acceptance  of  law  rests  upon  a  belief  that  legal  institutions, including inheritance, are legitimate, and legitimacy cannot exist unless decisions are
reasoned. Hence, it is important that the succession to property be perceived as a
responsible,  reasoned  act,  according  the  survivors  their  just  deserts.” DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 147.
35. See GAUBATZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 146-47.
36. For example, under the current Uniform Probate Code, those who possess the
required level of mental competency must also be at lease eighteen years old in order
to possess testamentary capacity. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as
amended 2010).
37. See Van Winkle v. Schoonmaker, 15 N.J. Eq. 384, 386 (N.J. Prerog. Ct.
1862)  (“As  to  the  real  estate,  the  will  is  clearly  invalid.    A  married  woman  is  incapa-
ble of devising real estate. She is also incapable of disposing of her chattels by will
without the consent of her husband. Such a will, being a mere nullity, will not be
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the married woman. Instead, these rules restricted the testamentary capacity
of all married women.
The testamentary incapacity of married women was based upon the
common law doctrine of coverture,38 which treated married women as having
no separate legal identity apart from their husbands.39 As such, married
women could not enter contracts or own property independently from their
husbands.40 Likewise, married women lacked the legal capacity to execute
wills.41 As women gradually gained legal rights and coverture disappeared,42
states amended the law of succession to grant married women the ability to
transfer property through wills, and today women possess the same testamentary capacity as men.43 Similar categorical legal incapacity rules also existed
at various times for other classes of individuals, such as felons44 and slaves.45
admitted   to   probate.”);;   WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 498   (“[A]   married  
woman is not only utterly incapable of devising land, . . . but also she is incapable of
making a testament of chattels, without the license of her husband.”).
38. See Bartlett v. Lahr (In re Bartlett’s  Estate), 190 N.W. 869, 870 (Neb. 1922)
(“At  common  law . . . coverture  destroyed  [the  wife’s]  testamentary  capacity.”);;  Kelly  
v.  Stevenson,  88  N.W.  739,  739  (Minn.  1902)  (“At   common law . . . , during coverture . . . a married woman had no testamentary capacity.”).
39. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442  (“By  marriage,  the  husband  
and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman
is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.”).
40. See Karen Pearlston, Married Women Bankrupts in the Age of Coverture, 34
LAW & SOC. INQ. 265, 265-66   (2009)   (“According   to   the   common   law   doctrine   of  
coverture,  which  framed  English  women’s  legal  relations  until  the  third  quarter  of  the  
nineteenth century, a married woman (or feme covert) could not own property (including wages) or make contracts, and she could not sue or be sued without the joinder of her husband.”); Reva B. Siegal, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating  Wives’  Rights  to  Earnings,  1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994)
(“For   centuries   the   common   law   of   coverture   gave   husbands   rights   in   their   wives’  
property and earnings, and prohibited wives from contracting, filing suit, drafting
wills,  or  holding  property  in  their  own  names.”).
41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
841-48   (2004)   (describing   the   “story   of   coverture’s   demise”   but   arguing   that   “[i]t  
overstates the changes that have occurred in family law over time, and excludes and
obscures  the  evidence  indicating  the  persistence  of  inequality”).
43. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010) (making no
distinction between the testamentary capacity of men and women). Some state statutes explicitly grant married women testamentary capacity. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 15-2-501 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014
2d Reg. Sess. of the 62nd Idaho Legislature.) (“A  married  woman  may  dispose  of  her  
property, whether separate or community, in the same manner as any other person
subject  to  the  restrictions  imposed  by  this  code.”).
44. See PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.3 (William J. Bowe et al. eds., 2003)
(explaining   that   at   one   time   a   felon   forfeited   his   property   and   therefore   “could   not  
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Like the testamentary incapacity of married women, these rules eventually
gave way to testamentary capacity rules that generally give all competent
individuals the legal capacity to execute wills.46
Despite the general elimination of these categorical incapacity rules, one
such rule persists – the testamentary incapacity of minors.47 Under the laws
of all states, children of a certain age cannot execute wills, regardless of
whether they possess the mental capacity that the law requires of adults.48 In
forty-eight states, the age at which children obtain the legal capacity to execute wills is eighteen.49 The two exceptions are Georgia, which sets the age
devise   his   lands,   nor   bequeath   his   chattels”   and   explaining   further   that   “[w]hether  
he lost capacity to make a will or testament, or whether he retained capacity in the
abstract,   but   ha[d]  no   property   to   devise   or   bequeath,   is  not   clear”   but   “[t]he   conse-
quences of both theories [are] identical.”).      “[M]odified   forms   of   civil   death   [for  
convicts] still exist by statute in some jurisdictions. However, the civil death laws
of most states do not entail holding a criminal incapable of executing an otherwise
valid will . . . .”    David  Rand,  Jr.,  Annotation,   Convict’s  Capacity  to  Make  Will, 84
A.L.R.3d 479 (1978); see Legislation, Civil Death Statutes – Medieval Fiction in a
Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968, 974 (1937). Occasionally, a state statute explicitly grants convicts testamentary capacity. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-10(b)
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“An   individual   who   has  
been  convicted  of  a  crime  shall  not  be  deprived  of  the  power  to  make  a  will.”).
45. See Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States,
39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.  299,  307  (2006)  (“Lacking  contractual  capacity, slaves could
not hold title to real or personal property, nor transfer any such property, either by
inheritance or intestacy . . . .”).    In  some  American  jurisdictions,  the  statute  governing  
testamentary capacity at one time denied testamentary capacity to those who lacked
capacity to enter contracts, which operated to exclude both married women and slaves
from those who could execute valid wills. See Rossi v. Fletcher, 418 F.2d 1169,
1170-71(D.C. Cir. 1969).
46. See GAUBATZ ET AL., supra note 17,  at  147  (explaining  that  most  “commonlaw restrictions on who could make a will, such as alienage and felony conviction, are
no longer applicable to the will-making   process”);;   see also, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010).
47. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 141 n.1.
48. See id.
49. See infra Table I.
Under the English common law, females of the age of twelve and males of
the age of fourteen could dispose of personal property through wills, but only adults
of the age of twenty-one could transfer real property through testamentary dispositions. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 18-19 (2011)
[hereinafter DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS]. The distinction between the age requirement for the ability to dispose of real property and personal property via wills and the
distinction between the testamentary capacity of males and females continued in the
United States well into the twentieth century. See Percy Bordwell, The Statute Law of
Wills, 14 IOWA L. REV. 172, 177-79 (1928-1929). By the middle part of the twentieth
century these distinctions largely had disappeared, and the majority states set the age
of testamentary capacity at twenty-one. See John B. Rees, Jr., American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 653-55 (1960). However, by 1987 all but two states had
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of testamentary capacity at fourteen,50 and Louisiana, which allows those who
are sixteen or older to execute wills.51 Despite the general age requirement
for testamentary capacity, some states provide exceptions to this rule and
allow certain minors to execute valid wills before reaching the age of eighteen. For example, some jurisdictions allow children who are married to execute wills52 and others grant testamentary capacity to minors who are members of the armed services.53
All in all, those who wish to execute wills must have testamentary
capacity; absent such capacity any attempt to execute a will is void. This
capacity rule entails two requirements. First, testators must possess a minimum level of mental competency.54 Second, testators must be of a certain
age.55 In the vast majority of states, the age requirement denies anyone under
the age of eighteen the legal capacity to execute a will.56 As such, the testamentary incapacity of minors represents a categorical rule that prohibits
children from executing wills, regardless of how considerate, mature, and
responsible they are.

lowered the age of testamentary capacity to eighteen or younger. See SAMUEL M.
DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 34 (1987)
(reporting that only Rhode Island, which set the required age at twenty-one, and Wyoming, which set the required age at nineteen, prevented those over the age of eighteen from executing wills).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-10(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014
Reg. Sess.) (“Every  individual  14  years  of  age  or  older may make a will, unless under
some legal disability arising either from a want of capacity or a want of perfect liberty
of  action.”).
51. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1476 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.)
(“A  minor  who  has  attained  the  age  of  sixteen years has capacity to make a donation,
but only mortis causa.”).
52. See infra Table I (identifying fourteen states that provide an exception for
married minors); see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:1 (West, Westlaw updated with laws current through Chapter 279 (End) of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (“Every  per-
son of the age of eighteen years and married persons under that age, of sane mind,
may devise and dispose of their property, real and personal, and of any right or interest they may have in any property,  by  their  last  will  in  writing.”).    Louisiana  allows  
minors under the age of sixteen to execute wills in favor of their spouses and children.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1476.
53. See infra Table I (identifying seven states the provide an exception for minors in military service); see also, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-1 (West, Westlaw
current with all legislation of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly (2014)
with effective dates through May 1, 2014) (“Any  person  of  sound  mind  who  is  eight-
een (18) years of age or older, or who is younger and a member of the armed forces,
or  of  the  merchant  marine  of  the  United  States,  or  its  allies,  may  make  a  will.”).
54. See supra Part II.A.i.
55. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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B. Legal Capacity of Minors in Other Contexts
In addition to testamentary incapacity, children possess a diminished legal capacity in other contexts.57 An understanding of the mechanics and rationales of the legal capacity rules for minors in these areas, particularly in
those contexts that are similar to testamentary gift-giving, can shed light on
potential areas for refinement of the capacity rules governing the execution of
wills by minors. In this regard, a comparative analysis of the ability of minors to enter contracts, to give inter vivos gifts, and to execute wills can provide a fresh perspective on the structure and policy of the law governing the
testamentary capacity of minors.

1. Contracts
Under traditional contract law, children can disaffirm most of the contracts into which they enter.58 As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains,  “[A]  natural  person  has  the  capacity  to  incur  only  voidable contractual
duties   until   the   beginning   of   the   day   before   the   person’s   eighteenth   birth-
day.”59 Pursuant to this rule, a child under the age of eighteen need not fulfill
his contractual promises; instead, if the child chooses, he may disaffirm the
contract and is thereby released from his obligations under the agreement.60
The  minor’s  ability  to  disavow  his  contractual  responsibilities,  however,  does  
not extend indefinitely past the age of majority. Either by some act of affirmance61 or by failing to disaffirm within a reasonable time after reaching the

57. See generally Cunningham, supra note 3, at 277.
58. See DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 10-11. One general excep-

tion to this rule is that children cannot disaffirm contracts for necessities, such as food
or clothing. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing   the   Myth   of   the   “Infancy   Law  
Doctrine”:   From   Incapacity   to   Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 488-90
(1994).    The  rationale  for  this  necessities  exception  is  that  “[t]he  law  did  not  want  to  
discourage merchants from selling basic necessities to minors out of fear that the
minor  would  later  disaffirm.”    Cunningham,  supra note 3, at 289.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
60. See Robert G. Edge, Voidability  of  Minors’  Contracts:  A  Feudal  Doctrine  in  
a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 207 (1967)   (“Disaffirmance   is   any   act   by  
which the minor indicates that he does not wish to be bound by the contract made
during his minority, i.e., he exercises his option to transform a voidable contract into
one which  is  void.”).
61. See DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 49,   at   12   (“[A]   child   on   reaching majority may, by word or conduct, ratify a contract into which he had entered
previously.”);;   see also, e.g., Fletcher v. Marshall, 632 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (holding that the “defendant’s  act  of  moving  into  the  apartment,  living  there  
for 1 ½ months, and making rent payments [after reaching the age of majority] constituted . . . unequivocal ratification of the lease,”  which  the  defendant  had  entered  into  
as a minor).
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age of eighteen,62 the child loses the ability to void the contracts that he entered into as a minor.
This   rule   that   limits   a   minor’s   contractual   capacity   is   founded   upon   a  
reasonable policy objective. Specifically, the law enables children to disaffirm their contractual responsibilities in order to protect them from suffering
the consequences of their poor decisions.63 As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin   explains,  “It   was   thought   that   the   minor   was   immature in both mind
and experience and that, therefore, he should be protected from his own bad
judgments  as  well  as  from  adults  who  would  take  advantage  of  him.”64 The
law therefore provides minors the ability to walk away from their contractual
responsibilities in order to implement a protective policy that aims to shield
children from improvident contractual obligations.65

2. Lifetime Gifts
Similar to the ability of minors to enter into only voidable contractual
relationships,66 children under the age of eighteen have a diminished legal
capacity to make irrevocable lifetime donative transfers. Indeed, mirroring
their contractual legal capacity, minors have the capacity to make only voidable inter vivos gifts.67 As the Restatement (Third) of Property explains, “Be-
62. See Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 126 N.W. 50, 52 (Wis. 1910)
(“[T]he  contract  of  a  minor,  other  than  for necessaries, is either void or voidable at his
option,   exercised   within   a   reasonable   time   after   his   coming   of   age.”);;   DAVIS,
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 49,   at   12   (“[A]   child   retains the power of disaffirmance for a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority.”).
63. See DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 10-11  (“[T]he  law  takes a
protective view of children when they enter into contractual agreements with others.
The vehicle for this protective attitude is the doctrine of disaffirmance.”);;   Juanda  
Lowder Daniel, Virtually   Mature:   Examining   the   Policy   of   Minors’   Incapacity   to
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 240-41  (2008)  (“The  longaccepted rationale for the minor incapacity doctrine has been that children lack the
ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of their acts, and thus should
not be  inextricably  bound  by  the  consequences  of  their  youthful  follies.”).
64. Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968); see
also Byers  v.  Lemay  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  282  S.W.2d  512,  514  (Mo.  1955)  (“The  pur-
pose is to shield minors against their own folly and inexperience and against unscrupulous persons . . . .”).
65. See In re O’Leary’s  Estate,  42  A.2d  624,  625  (Pa.  1945)  (“An  infant  is  not  
competent to contract. This positive inhibition is the way of the law to protect infants
against their own lack of discretion and against the snares of  designing  persons.”).
66. See supra Part II.B.1.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§  8.2(b)  (2003)  (adding  that  “[a]  minor  does  not  have  capacity  to  make  a  gift.”);;  see
also Bankers’  Trust  Co.  v.  Bank  of  Rockville  Ctr. Trust Co., 168 A. 733, 740 (1933)
(stating   that   it   is   “the   settled   and   salutary   rule   of   law   that   an   infant’s   gift   is   voida-
ble.”);;  Person  v.  Chase,  37  Vt.  647,  649  (1865)  (“If  an  infant  cannot  trade,  nor bind
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fore reaching majority, the minor may disaffirm the gift. After reaching majority, the minor may either disaffirm or ratify the gift. The failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time after reaching majority constitutes a ratification
of   the   gift.”68 Thus, before reaching the age of majority, children can both
disaffirm their contractual obligations and revoke their donative transfers.
Scholars and courts have paid little attention to the policy behind the
diminished legal capacity of minors in the context of lifetime gifts. However,
just as the rules governing the contractual legal capacity of minors mirror the
capacity rules in the context of gifts,69 the ability of a child to revoke donative
transfers presumably furthers a protective policy similar to that served by a
minor’s   ability to disavow a contractual obligation. The diminished legal
capacity of minors to give irrevocable lifetime gifts therefore is likely intended to protect children from suffering the consequences of poor donative decisions.    As  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont  explains,  “An  infant  has  no  more  
capacity to dispose of his property by gift than he has by contract, and it is
essential that he should be protected from the consequences of an improvident gift . . . as it is that he should be protected from the consequences of an
improvident  contract  .  .  .  .”70
In sum, in addition to their testamentary incapacity, minors have a
diminished legal capacity in a variety of other contexts, including in making
contracts and lifetime gifts. However, while a will executed by a child
is void, meaning that it is inherently invalid, a contract or donative transfer
entered into by a minor is merely voidable. As such, a contract or gift
made by a minor is not necessarily invalid; instead, such transactions are enforceable unless disaffirmed or revoked by the minor. This distinction
between the void status of wills and the voidable status of contracts and gifts
has important implications for the analysis of the policy goals of the testamentary incapacity rules. This Article now turns to the evaluation of
potential policy rationales for the testamentary age requirement. These rationales include that minor incapacity serves as a protective measure,71 that
himself by any contract in relations to trade, – if he can neither purchase, nor sell, nor
dispose of property, so as to bind himself, – a fortiori he cannot bind himself by a gift
of his property . . . .”);;   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
34.4(1)  (1992)  (“A  minor  does  not  have  the  legal  capacity  to  make . . . a valid inter
vivos  donative  transfer.”).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.2(b) (2003); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
34.4(1)(a)  (1992)  (“[A]  purported  donative  transfer  made  by  a  minor  may  be  ratified  
by the minor when the minor attains majority, and a failure to repudiate the purported
donative transfer within a reasonable time after the minor attains majority is deemed a
ratification of it . . . .”).
69. Compare supra text accompanying notes 58-62, with supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
70. Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647, 649 (1865).
71. See infra Part III.
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age serves as a proxy for competence,72 and that mandatory intestacy implements forced parental inheritance.73

III. INCAPACITY AS A PROTECTIVE POLICY
The traditional explanation for the testamentary incapacity of minors is
that it implements a protective policy by shielding children from the consequences of making imprudent transfers of property through wills.74 Under
this rationale, minors are portrayed as necessarily lacking the maturity to
responsibly exercise testamentary power. As one early twentieth century
treatise explains:
While it is perhaps hardly fair to say that all persons who have not attained the age of majority are supposed to be without [the requisite
mental capacity to execute a will], yet the lack of discretion characterizing those of tender years would be apt to result in an unwise exercise
of such capacity, even assuming in the abstract that it existed. Hence
the policy of the law at present is to deny this power to minors. 75

Likewise, the Supreme Court of North Carolina explains simply that
“[t]he  common  law has wisely fixed on the age of [majority], as the earliest
period, when the human mind has attained sufficient maturity to act with discretion”  when  making  testamentary  decisions.76
While some authorities explicitly endorse the protective policy rationale
to explain the testamentary incapacity of minors,77 others implicitly adopt this
rationale by drawing analogies to rules that govern the incapacity of minors in
other contexts.78 Under the common law, some courts reasoned that because
children had a diminished legal capacity to make lifetime conveyances of
72. See infra Part IV.
73. See infra Part V.
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 8.2 reporter’s  note  3 (2003)  (“The  age  requirement[’s] . . . purpose [is to] assur[e]
that  only  a  person  of  mature  judgment  can  execute  a  will.”).
75. GEORGE E. GARDNER & WALTER T. DUNMORE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
WILLS 86 (2d ed. 1916); see also JOHN E. ALEXANDER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF WILLS § 297, at 391 (1917)  (“[A]n  infant  under  a  certain  age  can  not  make  a  tes-
tamentary disposition of property, not because of unsoundness of mind such as insanity,  rather  because  the  law  assumes  that  his  mind  has  not  sufficiently  matured.”);;  JOHN
R. ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 105, at 62 (1904)  (“The  law  arbitrarily  
fixes an age before which the infant shall be conclusively deemed not to have enough
discretion  to  make  a  will.”).
76. Williams v. Baker, 4 N.C. 401, 401 (1816).
77. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
78. See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 320 (“[C]ourts  addressing  the  testamentary  
capacity of minors made an effort to reconcile their decisions with other rights and
responsibilities  of  children  to  develop  a  consistent  jurisprudence.”).
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property via deeds, minors likewise had a diminished legal capacity to make
testamentary transfers of property through wills.79 Because the restriction on
minors’  legal  capacity  to  execute  deeds  was  based upon the policy of protecting children from making imprudent conveyances of land,80 courts that based
the testamentary incapacity of minors on their corresponding diminished capacity to execute deeds implicitly recognized a protective policy rationale for
minors’  inability  to  execute  wills.
Thus, under the traditional rationale, minors lack the discretion to prudently exercise testamentary power and consequently are in need of protection from their own inexperience; therefore, the law denies children the legal
capacity to execute wills.81 This restriction on testamentary power is distinct
from the minimum mental capacity that is required of adults. Even if children
possess the requisite mental competency to execute wills, the law categorically denies them the ability to give testamentary gifts.82 By doing so, the law
imposes a safeguard against the youthful indiscretion of minors. This safeguard can be seen as protecting both the minor, who is denied testamentary
capacity, and the family members whom the child could disinherit if he had
the ability to execute a will.

A. Protecting Minors
At   first   glance,  the   prudence  of   limiting   minors’   legal   capacity   to   exe-
cute  wills   may  seem  as  intuitive  as   that  of  placing  restrictions  on  children’s  
abilities to enter contracts and to give lifetime gifts. If children need protec-

79. See id. (“Minors   did   not   have   the   capacity   to   dispose   of   property   by   deed,  
and so it was thought that they should not be able to dispose of real property by will
until  reaching  the  age  of  majority  (which,  at  the  time,  was  21).”);;  see, e.g., Williams, 4
N.C. at 402 (“We   cannot   subscribe   to   the   doctrine   that   a   person   may   have   a   legal  
capacity to dispose of property by will, and yet be under a legal incapacity to dispose
of  that  same  property  by  deed.”).
80. See Ferguson v. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co., 11 S.W. 347, 348
(Tex.  1889)  (“The  reason  for  the  rule  that  holds  the  deed  of  an  infant  voidable  is  to  
protect the infant against his own imbecility and lack of discretion, and against the
craft  of  others.”).
81. Viewing the testamentary incapacity of minors as a way that state law protects children corresponds to the numerous other ways that states aim to protect children. See Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting
Children Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 792-94 (2010).
82. See Goodell  v.  Pike,  40  Vt.  319,  324  (1867)  (“This  will  was  absolutely  inva-
lid, and its probate was at the least unauthorized. The disability arose not from unsoundness of mind, the question with relation to which, must always be a matter of
judgment. It was an absolute disability depending upon an arbitrary fact which is not
disputed.”);;  ALEXANDER, supra note 75 (“Testamentary power . . . is denied . . . not
because of unsoundness of mind, but for reasons of policy once existing, which to a
limited  extent  still  exist,  and  which  have  colored  the  law  on  the  subject.”).
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tion from improvidently transferring property during their lifetimes,83 then
they would seem to need the same protection when planning testamentary
transfers of property. However, the context of testamentary gift-giving fundamentally differs in several important respects from the contexts of contractual obligations and inter vivos donative transfers. These differences reduce
the dangers that children face when executing wills and ultimately call into
question the need to categorically deny minors testamentary capacity. Moreover, to the extent that children need protection, the law of wills already includes a number of safeguards that caution all testators from making unconsidered testamentary decisions.

1. Diminished Need for Protection
The first characteristic of testamentary decision-making that suggests
minors do not need the protection of incapacity is that wills are inherently
ambulatory. Unlike contracts and lifetime gifts,84 wills can be revoked or
amended   at   the   testator’s   sole   discretion   any   time   prior   to his death.85 If
a testator changes his mind regarding the substance of his will, he can either
alter   the   will’s   terms   by   executing   a   codicil86 or revoke the will in its
entirety.87 Thus, by their very nature, wills provide the testator protection
from imprudent testamentary transfers. If minors had the ability to execute
wills they would not necessarily suffer the consequences of poor testamentary
decisions because they would not immediately be bound by those decisions.
As they mature and gain discretion and foresight, minor testators could always rethink their testamentary decisions and alter the terms of their wills.
The built-in  protection  that  is  provided  by  a  will’s  inherent revocability
becomes apparent when testamentary transfers are compared to contractual
obligations and inter vivos donative transfers. Whereas wills are intrinsically
voidable,88 contracts89 and lifetime gifts are not.90 One who enters into a
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1-2.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 251.
See id. at 252 (“A  codicil supplements a will rather than replacing it.”).
See id. at 251-52 (“All  states  permit  revocation  of  a  will  in  one  of  two  ways:  
(1) by a subsequent writing executed with testamentary formalities, or (2) by a physical act such  as  destroying,  obliterating,  or  burning  the  will.”).
88. See id.
89. See Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4
n.6 (2010).
90. See Beaumont v. Beaumont,   152   F.   55,   59   (3d   Cir.   1907)   (“Where   delivery of the property has once been made and possession transferred, the gift is irrevocable  .  .  .  without  any  retransfer  of  the  ownership  by  the  donee.”);;  Dudley  v.  Uptown  
Nat’l  Bank  of  Moline,  167  N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) (explaining that one
requirement  for  a  legally  effective  gift  is  “an  absolute  and  irrevocable  delivery  of  the  
property to the claimed donee”).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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contract or gives a gift cannot unilaterally nullify his contractual obligations
or recover ownership of donated property.91 The legally enforceable nature
of contracts and gifts is precisely the reason that the law seeks to protect children from imprudent contractual and donative decisions.92 Without the added
protection   of   minors’   diminished   legal   capacity   to   make   legally   enforceable  
contracts and gifts, children would be bound by potentially devastating contractual and donative decisions. By giving children the option to void contracts and gifts, the law provides minors the ability to reconsider their poor
contractual and donative choices, thereby implementing a safeguard against
children’s  inexperience  and  indiscretion.93
This distinction between the legally enforceable nature of contracts
and gifts and the voidable nature of wills calls into question the necessity of
restricting   children’s   ability   to   exercise   testamentary   power.      All   wills,  
whether executed by minors or adults, are inherently voidable because the
testator can revoke his will prior to death.94 Therefore, if the law gave minors
testamentary capacity, children would have the same protection from imprudent testamentary decisions as the law specifically grants them with respect to
imprudent contractual and donative decisions. However, by denying minors
the ability to execute wills, the law imposes a more restrictive protective
measure in the context of testamentary decision-making. Unlike contracts
and lifetime gifts, children cannot execute wills and then reevaluate their
testamentary decisions. Instead, the law voids all testamentary decisions
made   by   minors  and   imposes  more  extreme  protective   measures   on   minors’  
testamentary freedom than it imposes on   minors’   contractual   and   donative  
freedoms. Because all testators already have the protection that is provided
by the inherent revocability of wills, the utility of denying testamentary capacity to minors is questionable.
The second characteristic of testamentary decision-making that suggests
that minors do not need the protection of legal incapacity is that testamentary
transfers take effect only upon  the  testator’s  death.95 Contracts and gifts take
effect during life; consequently, children could hypothetically squander their
resources and become destitute as a result of their imprudent contractual and
donative decisions. To protect against this possibility, the law gives minors
the option to void contracts and gifts.96 By contrast, because wills direct the
distribution   of   the   testator’s   property upon death, they have no legal effect
See supra notes 89-90.
See supra Part II.B.1-2.
See supra Part II.B.1-2.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 251.
See In re Fabbri’s  Will,  140  N.E.2d  269,  271  (N.Y.  1957)  (“[A]  will  is  inop-
erative and wholly ineffective until the death of the testator . . . .”);;  Carolyn  L.  Dessin,  
The Troubled Relationship of Will Contracts and Spousal Protection: Time for an
Amicable Separation, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 435,  437  (1996)  (“[W]ills are ambulatory,
which means that a will is ineffective until the death of the testator . . . .”).
96. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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during   the   testator’s   life.97 Therefore, if minors were granted testamentary
capacity, they would not suffer the consequences of their poor testamentary
decisions. As a result, the protection of the legal incapacity of minors in the
context of wills is of diminished importance.98
The reduced importance of protection from economic loss in the context of testamentary decision-making is evident in a comparison of the mental
competency thresholds for wills and lifetime gifts. To validly execute a will,
a   testator   must   be   capable   of   knowing   “the   nature   and   extent   of   his   or  
her property, the natural objects of his or her bounty, and the disposition that
he  or  she  is  making  of  that  property.”99 Any mention of the  testator’s  under-
standing of the economic consequences of testamentary gift-giving is
noticeably absent. By contrast, the mental capacity requirement for lifetime
gifts entails a higher competency threshold.100 In addition to possessing
the same competency as is required to execute a will, one who wishes to give
a   lifetime   gift   “must   also   be   capable   of   understanding   the   effect   that   the  
gift   may   have   on   the   future   financial   security   of   the   donor.”101 This
higher competency requirement “has the objective of protecting the
incompetent   .   .   .   donor   from   suffering   economic   loss   during   life[]”   and   the  
consequent   potential   of   “impoverishment.”102 Conversely, the threat of impoverishment is absent from the context of testamentary gift-giving, and the
law therefore requires a lower level of competency to execute a will than to
make a lifetime donative transfer.
Thus, the second important distinction between testamentary transfers of
property through wills and lifetime transfers of property through contracts
97. See Fabbri, 140 N.E.2d at 271; Dessin, supra note 95, at 437.
98. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 145 (“Protecting a dead person from

economic loss is of course not a consideration.”).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.1(b) (2003).
100. See id. § 8.1(c).
101. Id.
102. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 145; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §  8.1  cmt.d  (2003)  (“Because  an  irrev-
ocable gift depletes financial resources that the donor may yet need, the standard for
mental   capacity   to   make   an   irrevocable   gift   is  higher   than   that   for   making   a   will.”).
Similarly, the greater need for protection in the context of lifetime gift giving as compared to testamentary gift giving is evident in the higher age restriction that Louisiana
places  on  minors’  abilities  to  give  lifetime  gifts  as  opposed  to  testamentary  gifts.    See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1476 cmt.(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.)
(“This  Article  recognizes  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  between execution of a
will and the making of an inter vivos donation, in terms of the considerations that
should   govern   a   minor’s   ability   to   make   such   dispositions.     The   testament . . . does
not  dispose  of  the  minor’s  property  until  a  later  date,  namely  the date of his death, in
contrast with a donation inter vivos, by which the minor presently and irrevocably
disposes of property. For that reason, a distinction between the ability to execute a
will and the ability to make an inter vivos donation is recognized . . . .”).
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and gifts is the extent to which those who enter such transactions experience
the consequences of their transfers. Whereas a minor who enters a contract or
gives a lifetime gift likely will be alive after the transfer is complete and
might squander resources that could be needed at a later date, a minor who
executes a will is inevitably dead at the time the testamentary transfer becomes effective. As a result, the minor will not experience the consequences
of any financial loss. Because minors will not experience the ramifications of
their testamentary decisions, the policy of protecting them from such decisions is of diminished importance.
The final important distinction between testamentary decision-making
and contractual and donative decision-making is that, if minors were able to
execute wills, they would be less likely to make impulsive testamentary decisions than they would be to make contractual or donative decisions. Minors
may make rash contractual or donative decisions because contracts and gifts
become effective immediately and, as such, they may feel pressure from the
other party to make hasty or imprudent decisions.103 In contrast, because of
the delayed effect of testamentary gifts,104 minors would experience less pressure to make hurried testamentary decisions.105 Put differently, because testamentary transfers become effective only upon the death of the testator –
which in the case of a minor would likely result in a considerable delay between the execution of a will and the effectiveness of a bequest – the beneficiary of a testamentary gift would have a weaker incentive to exert pressure.
Consequently, a minor testator would be less likely to rush to finalize his
testamentary decisions.
Moreover, because testamentary decision-making necessarily involves
recognition  of  the  testator’s  mortality,  people  often  put  off  making  testamen-
tary decisions in an effort to avoid the unpleasant experience of acknowledging the inevitability of death.106 Contractual and donative decision-making,
by contrast, do not implicate the same notions of mortality and, as a result,
the risk of rash decision-making is greater in these contexts. Both the delayed
effect of testamentary transfers and their connection with the death of the
testator diminish the concern that minors will impulsively and imprudently
103. Indeed, part of the rationale behind the minor incapacity rules in the context
of contracts and lifetime gifts is that unscrupulous parties may try to take advantage
of   minors’   inexperience   and   pressure   them   into   making   improvident   decisions   from  
which they will benefit. See supra notes 64-65, 70 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
105. See Cunningham, supra note 3,   at   321   (“[I]t   could   be   argued   that  
creating a will is not the type of decision that is likely to result from impulse or
peer  pressure  .  .  .  .  ”).
106. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 59 (“[A]bout half the population
dies intestate, . . . [so why] do many people . . . not seek legal advice and make wills?
One reason, of course, is that most people cannot accept and plan for the fact of their
own deaths.”);; Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate
Planning, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 434-38 (2012).
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execute wills. This diminished concern stands alongside the inherent revocability of wills and the delayed effectiveness of testamentary dispositions as
important distinctions between testamentary decision-making and contractual
and donative decision-making. These distinctions minimize the need to protect minors by denying them testamentary capacity.

2. Other Protective Measures
In addition to the differences between wills and contracts and lifetime
gifts, the need for the protection of the testamentary incapacity of minors is
called into question by the various safeguards that are already embedded in
the law of wills. Various rules and doctrines within the law of wills that apply to all testators serve the same functions as the testamentary incapacity of
minors – namely, to prevent testators from making unconsidered and unreasoned testamentary dispositions. Thus, because the law of wills already includes a variety of protective measures, the protection provided by the testamentary age restriction is of minimal utility.
The first of the safeguards that provides protection from improvident
testamentary decision-making is the basic mental capacity requirement.
As discussed previously, all testators must possess a minimum level of mental
competency to validly execute wills.107 Although this rule requires that the
testator possess a relatively low level of competency,108 it ensures that a testator   executes   a   will   while   “sane”   and   possessing   a   “rational   mind.”109
By requiring the testator to meet this threshold, the law provides testators
some protection from making rash dispositions of their property.110 Certainly, this requirement does not ensure that testators will make thoughtful and
reasoned testamentary decisions; however, it is lower than that required in
other contexts because the testator is invariably dead at the time the will becomes effective and therefore less protection is needed in the context of testamentary gift-giving.111
The second protective measure that safeguards testators from making
imprudent testamentary decisions is the formality associated with willexecution. To validly execute a will, the testator must comply with various
107. See supra Part II.A.1.
108. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 146.
109. See id. at 145-46 (explaining that the testamentary mental capacity require-

ment is lower than the competency requirement for contracts but higher than the competency requirement for marriage).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§   8.1   cmt.b   (2003)   (“[T]he   requirement   that   the   donor   must   have   mental   capacity  
in order to make or revoke a will, will substitute, or gifts serves a protective function . . . . The law protects a person who lacks mental capacity by providing that
such a person is incapable of effectively formulating the requisite donative or
testamentary  intent.”).
111. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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formalities, including that the will be written, signed by the testator, and attested by at least two witnesses.112 The primary purpose of these formalities
is  to   ensure   that   a   will   accurately   and  reliably   reflects  the  testator’s  true  in-
tent.113 In connection with this goal, will formalities serve a cautionary function that encourages the testator to reflect upon the importance and legal significance of his decision to execute a will.114
By mandating that the testator write out the terms of his will, sign
the testamentary document, and locate witnesses to observe the willexecution process, the law requires the testator to comply with formalities
that transform the execution of a will into a ceremony.115 The ritualistic
or ceremonial quality of the execution process reminds the testator of the
importance of his testamentary decisions and encourages him to approach the
execution of a will with careful planning and adequate consideration.116 By
encouraging the testator to undertake the process with a contemplative state
of mind, will formalities discourage testators from hastily and imprudently
exercising testamentary power.117 As such, the formalities of will-execution
would provide minor testators some protection from making irresponsible
testamentary decisions.118
Finally, to the extent that the minor incapacity doctrine is intended to
protect   against   wrongdoers   who   are   intent   on   taking   advantage   of   minors’  
inexperience, the law of wills already includes a number of safeguards, in112. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 202 (warning  that  “these  basic  re-
quirements for execution  of  wills  vary  considerably  in  detail  from  state  to  state”).
113. See In re Will   of   Ranney,   589   A.2d   1339,   1344   (N.J.   1991)   (“The  
primary purpose of [will] formalities is to ensure that the document reflects the uncoerced   intent   of   the   testator.”);;   John   H.   Langbein,   Substantial Compliance with the
Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,   492   (1975)   (“The   formalities   are   designed   to  
perform   functions   which   will   assure   that   [the   testator’s]   estate   really   is   distributed  
according  to  his  intention.”).
114. See Langbein, supra note 113, at 494-95; Miller, supra note 12, at 261-62.
115. See Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61
U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 153-57 (2012).
116. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1,   5   (1941)   (“Compliance   with   the   total   combination  of   re-
quirements for the execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value, since
the general ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator was acting in a casual
or  haphazard  fashion.”).    
117. See Miller, supra note 12, at 261-62  (“A  secondary  aspect  of  formality  is its
tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator. Formality
thus prevents enforcement of casual statements and unpremeditated action . . . .”).
118. The role of formality in protecting minors is recognized in Louisiana, which
requires that minors be eighteen to give lifetime gifts and sixteen to execute wills.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1476 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“A  
minor who has attained the age of sixteen years has capacity to make a donation, but
only mortis causa.”).    Part  of  the  rationale  behind  this  age  requirement  discrepancy  is  
that will-execution  “is  subject  to  more  strict  formalities.”    Id. art. 1476 cmt. (b).
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cluding the doctrines of undue influence, duress, and fraud.119 The undue
influence   doctrine   invalidates   testamentary   dispositions   when   a   “wrongdoer  
exerted  such  influence  over  the  donor  that  it  overcame  the  donor’s  free  will  
and caused the donor to make a donative transfer that the donor would not
otherwise  have  made.”120 Similarly, the doctrine of duress invalidates a will
when   a   wrongdoer’s   influence   over   the   testator   was   “overtly   coercive.”121
Finally, the doctrine of fraud invalidates testamentary dispositions that are
made because the testator was deceived by affirmative misrepresentations.122
Because the law of wills already includes these protective measures, the need
to impose the additional safeguard of denying minors the capacity to execute
wills is diminished.
In sum, the need to protect minors from their own inexperience is of
diminished importance in the context of testamentary decision-making.
Three key differences between contractual and donative decision-making and
testamentary decision-making reduce the need for a categorical age restriction
on testamentary capacity. First, unlike contracts and gifts, wills are
inherently revocable, which would allow a minor testator to reconsider his
testamentary decisions.123 Second, unlike contracts and gifts, wills only become effective upon the death of the testator.124 If minors could execute wills
they would not bear the economic ramifications of their improvident testamentary decisions. Finally, because wills only become effective upon death
and   necessarily   involve   a   confrontation   with   the  testator’s   mortality,   minors
would be less likely to make rash testamentary decisions or be pressured into
executing wills.125
Moreover, the law of wills already includes a number of safeguards that
would protect minors from their immaturity and indiscretion. The first is the
general mental capacity requirement.126 By requiring all testators to possess a
minimum level of competency, the law protects testators from making uncon119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.3 (2003).
120. Id. § 8.3(b). “The  doctrine  of  undue  influence  protects  against  overreaching  
by a wrongdoer . . . on  account  of  the  donor’s  age,  inexperience,  dependence,  physical  
or  mental  weakness,  or  other  factor.”   Id. § 8.3 cmt. (e).
121. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 189; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §  8.3  (c)  (2003)  (“A  donative  transfer  
is procured by duress if the wrongdoer threatened to perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced the donor into making a donative transfer that the donor would not
otherwise  have  made.”).
122. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 186 (“Fraud  occurs  where  the  testa-
tor is deceived by a deliberate misrepresentation and does that which he would not
have done  had  the  misrepresentation  not  been  made.”).
123. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
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sidered testamentary decisions. The second safeguard is the formality of willexecution.127 By requiring the testator to complete the formal process of willexecution, the law reminds the testator that a will is an important document
that has legal consequences. The testator is therefore cautioned to approach
the execution of a will seriously and with adequate consideration. The final
safeguard is the collection of doctrines, including fraud, duress, and undue
influence, that protect the testator from imposition by wrongdoers.128 Thus,
because the age requirement restricts testamentary freedom, the questionable
utility of the testamentary incapacity of minors and the safeguards that are
already imbedded in the law of wills suggest that the age requirement should
be abolished.

B. Protecting Surviving Spouses
A minor testator would be dead at the time his will becomes effective
and therefore would not experience the consequences of his imprudent decisions. However, his will could negatively affect disinherited family members. Specifically, if a minor is married, imprudent testamentary decisions
could threaten the financial security of a surviving spouse. Rather than protecting the child from making testamentary decisions that are harmful to himself, the testamentary incapacity of minors could be seen as protection for
surviving spouses who experience the ramifications of poor testamentary
decisions. Under this rationale, incapacity protects surviving spouses from
disinheritance by requiring minors to die without wills, which forces the minor’s   estate   into   intestacy   and   requires the minor to leave a portion of his
estate to his surviving spouse.
When a decedent dies without a will, his estate passes according to the
default   distributive   scheme   that   is   set   forth   in   a   state’s   intestacy   statute. 129
The intestacy statutes of all states   attempt   to   distribute   a   decedent’s   estate  
in a way that  mimics  an  ordinary  person’s  desired  estate  plan.130 For example, if a widower dies without a will, his estate is passed on to his surviving
children.131 By   passing   the   widower’s   property   to   his   children, the law
attempts to distribute his estate in the manner that he likely would have chosen   had   he   executed   a   will.      To   serve   the   goal   of   fulfilling   the   testator’s  
probable intent, the intestacy statutes in all states distribute the estate within
the  decedent’s  family.132
Forcing   minors’   estates   into   intestacy   protects   surviving   spouses   be-
cause, under the intestacy laws of all states, surviving spouses receive a por127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 60.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 73.
See id. at 78-79.
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tion  of  the  deceased  spouse’s  estate.133 In essence, the age requirement protects the financial  stability  of  surviving  spouses  by  restricting  minors’  ability  
to disinherit them. Nonetheless, this type of protective rationale does not
adequately explain the testamentary incapacity of minors because the law of
wills already provides surviving spouses protection from disinheritance.134
For example, in many states spouses are already protected from unintentional
disinheritance. If a testator executes a will and subsequently marries, the
surviving  spouse  may  share  in  the  decedent’s  estate  despite the testator’s failure to provide for the spouse in his will.135 The rationale underlying this rule
is  that  the  testator’s  omission  of  a  spouse  from  a  premarital  will  likely  does  
not express the intent to disinherit the spouse.136 Instead, the surviving
spouse’s   omission   is   likely   the   result   of   the   testator’s   inadvertent   failure   to  
update an obsolete will to reflect changed familial circumstances.137
Additionally, surviving spouses are already protected from intentional
disinheritance by the forced spousal share, which provides the surviving
spouse   a   portion   of   the   decedent’s   estate   regardless   of   the   terms   of   the   de-
ceased  spouse’s  will.138 Thus, even if the decedent expresses an affirmative
desire to disinherit a spouse, the survivor still receives a portion of the estate.139 Because spouses already enjoy protection from both intentional and
unintentional disinheritance, testamentary incapacity is not needed to protect
the surviving spouses of minor testators.140 As such, if the testamentary incapacity of minors is intended to protect potentially disinherited surviving
spouses, the age requirement for executing wills should be eliminated.

C. Protecting Surviving Children
Although the testamentary incapacity of minors is not needed to protect
minor testators or their surviving spouses, the incapacity rules could be justified as protection for the surviving children of minor testators. Mirroring the
protection from unintentional disinheritance that surviving spouses enjoy,141
pretermitted heir statutes provide a surviving child a portion of the estate

See id. at 63.
See infra Part III.C.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (1990, as amended 2010).
Id. § 2-301 cmt.
See id.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425-38.
See id.
The spousal protection rationale is also undermined by the fact that several
states grant married children testamentary capacity despite the general rule that denies
children testamentary capacity. See supra note 52.
141. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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when the testator executes a will and subsequently has a child.142 However,
unlike surviving spouses,143 surviving children do not enjoy protection from
intentional disinheritance.144 If a parent wants to disinherit a child, the law
honors his desire to do so.145 As such, surviving children of a minor testator
could experience the negative consequences of imprudent testamentary decisions. Indeed, a minor testator could squander resources through the irresponsible exercise of testamentary power that would be better used for the
support of his surviving children.
The testamentary incapacity of minors could therefore be seen as protecting  a  minor’s  surviving   children  by  foreclosing  the  possibility   that  a  mi-
nor testator might intentionally disinherit them. By mandating that the minor
die  without  a  will,  the  law  forces  the  minor’s  estate  into  intestacy.    Under  the  
intestacy laws of all states, the estate of a parent is distributed either to his
surviving child or to his surviving spouse, or it is divided amongst his surviving spouse and surviving children.146 As a result, the financial security of a
minor’s  surviving  child  is  protected  either  directly  by  a  share  of  the  estate  or  
indirectly  by  the  passing  of  the  estate  to  the  decedent’s surviving spouse, who
presumably provides for the needs of the child.
Despite the role that the testamentary incapacity rules might play in protecting children from disinheritance, this rationale is not a compelling explanation of the indiscriminate testamentary incapacity of all minors. Because
the age restriction conflicts with the fundamental policy objective of the law
of wills, which is to allow people to freely distribute their property upon
death,147 the incapacity rules should be narrowly tailored. The testamentary
incapacity of all minors is an overly broad mechanism by which to implement
the policy of protecting children from disinheritance. Only a small fraction of
minors have children.148 Thus, if child protection is the goal of the age re142. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations   of   Probate’s   Family   Protection   Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L REV. 411,
417-18 (2009).
143. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
144. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 466 (“In  all  states  except  Louisiana,  
a child or other descendant has no statutory protection against intentional disinheritance by a parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave any property to a
child,  not  even  the  proverbial  one  dollar.”).
145. See id. at 467.
146. See id. at 73.
147. See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 883-85.
148. Although not a precise representation of the number of minors who are parents, the birth rate for teenage girls suggests that only a small fraction of minors are
parents. In 2010, the birth rate for girls ages ten to fourteen was 4 per 1000, and the
birth rate for girls ages fifteen to seventeen was 17.3 per 1000. CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTIONS, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: FINAL
DATA FOR 2010, 61 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 4-5 (2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_01.pdf#table02.
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striction, the rule denies all children testamentary capacity to prevent only a
small subset of minors from disinheriting their offspring.
A more focused approach to protecting surviving children of deceased
minors would be to give those children a forced share of   a   minor   testator’s  
estate. Instead of denying all children the ability to execute wills, the law
could grant all minors testamentary capacity and require those minors who
are parents to provide for their children after death. This type of protection
from disinheritance would operate similarly to the forced spousal share that
protects surviving spouses from intentional disinheritance.149 Under such a
scheme, a surviving child of a minor testator would take a portion of the minor’s  estate  regardless  of  the terms of the will.150 This forced share for children of minor testators would both protect children from disinheritance and
would provide greater testamentary freedom than a categorical age restriction
that denies all minors testamentary capacity.
If protection of children from disinheritance were a primary policy goal
of the law of wills, the categorical incapacity of minors could be justified as
protection for the relatively small group of children who are born to minor
parents. However, it is not.151 As previously mentioned, the law of wills
protects children from unintentional disinheritance but if an adult testator
wants to disinherit his child, he may do so.152 That the protection of children
from disinheritance is not a primary policy objective of the law of wills is
also evidenced by the general mental competency requirement for executing
wills. For the purpose of comparison, consider again the mental capacity
threshold for lifetime gifts. This competency requirement mandates that the
donor   “be   capable of understanding the effect that the gift may have on the
future financial security . . . of anyone who may be dependent on the donor.”153 Conversely, an understanding of the financial dependence of potential beneficiaries is not part of the testamentary mental capacity require149. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
150. Some have suggested that the law of wills should provide all children greater

protection from disinheritance by implementing a forced share for children of all
testators. See, e.g., Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499, 519-20 (1964).
151. Scholars have heavily criticized the law of wills for not placing more importance on the protection of children from disinheritance. See, e.g., Deborah A.
Batts, I  Didn’t  Ask  to  be  Born:  The  American  Law  of  Disinheritance  and  a  Proposal  
for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197 (1990);
Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
152. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. Louisiana is the only
state  to  provide  children  a  share  of  a  deceased  parent’s  estate,  regardless  of  the  intent  
of the parent. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg.
Sess.). However, this forced share is available in only limited circumstances. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1494.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.1(c) (2003).
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ment.154 A testator can execute a will that disinherits a dependent while unaware of the effect that disinheritance will have on the financial security of the
dependent.155 In contrast to the capacity rules regarding lifetime gifts, the
absence of a requirement that the testator understand the financial implications of his will suggests that protection from improvident disinheritance of
dependents is not a policy objective that adequately explains the categorical
testamentary incapacity of minors.
In sum, the diminished importance of the protections afforded by the
minor incapacity doctrine ultimately illuminates the need for reform of the
testamentary age requirement. For states basing their minor incapacity rules
upon a protective policy rationale that is aimed at protecting the minor, the
differences between testamentary decision-making and contractual and donative decision-making suggest that the minor incapacity doctrine is not needed
and should be abolished.156 Similarly, if the testamentary incapacity of minors  is  aimed  at  protecting  a  minor’s  surviving  spouse,  the  protection  that  the  
law already provides surviving spouses suggests that additional protection is
not needed and the age restriction should be eliminated.157 Finally, if the age
requirement  is  intended  to  protect  a  minor’s  children,  the  requirement’s  overinclusiveness – that is, its inclusion of minors who do not have children –
suggests that the incapacity rules should be more narrowly tailored.

IV. AGE AS A PROXY FOR COMPETENCE
If the traditional protective policy rationale does not adequately justify
the categorical testamentary incapacity of minors,158 alternative rationales
may better substantiate the minor incapacity doctrine’s   place   in   the   law   of  
wills. One such alternative rationale is that the age requirement serves as a
proxy for the minimum level of mental competency that all testators must
possess to validly execute wills. All testators must surpass a mental capacity
threshold in order to validly exercise testamentary power.159 This mental
capacity requirement mandates that, at the time of will-execution,160 the testator  “be capable of knowing and understanding in a general way the nature and
extent of his . . . property, the natural objects of his . . . bounty, and the disposition  that  he  .  .  .  is  making  of  that  property”  and  that  he  “be  capable  of  relat-

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. § 8.1(b).
See id.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 241 (2d ed. 1953).
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ing these [three] elements to one another and forming an orderly desire regarding the disposition of the property.”161

A. Conclusive Presumption of Incompetence
Because the probate process takes place after the testator’s   death
and frequently long after the will is executed,162 the court may have difficulty
assessing  the  testator’s  competency.163 As one practitioner  explains,  “Usually  
there is not any contemporaneous examination of the testator, nor any
documented evaluations in the time period of the will, so it is very difficult to
prove, retrospectively, that a testator lacked testamentary capacity at the
precise  moment  when  the  will  was  executed.”164 To overcome some of these
evidentiary   difficulties,   the   probate   court’s   task   in   determining   whether  
a testator possessed this requisite level of mental capacity is facilitated by a
presumption of competency that is triggered when a will is offered that was
executed after the testator reached the age of majority.165 The rationale
underlying this presumption is that most adults satisfy the competency
requirement, and therefore a contestant of a validly executed will should

161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.1(b) (2003); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 141.
162. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 116, at 6 (explaining that at the time of
probate   “the   testator   will   inevitably   be   dead   and   therefore   unable   to   testify . . . .”).    
Statutes in a handful of states allow probate proceedings to commence before the
death of the testator. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (West, Westlaw through
end of 2014 Fiscal Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-01 (West, Westlaw
Current through the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 59 of the 130th GA (20132014)). “These   statutes   authorize   a   person   to   institute   during   life   an   adversary   pro-
ceeding to declare the validity of a will and the testamentary capacity and freedom
from   undue   influence   of   the   person   executing   the   will.” DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 2, at 156.
163. See J. Edward Spar, Attorney’s  Guide  to  Competency  and  Undue  Influence,
13 NAELA Q. 7, 8 (“Because  testamentary  capacity  is  such  a  low  standard,  and  be-
cause prospective evaluation of the impaired testator is still not commonly performed
and documented (and when it is, it is almost always at the request of a competent
testator, or by his or her anticipated beneficiaries), it is usually very difficult to prove
retrospectively that a testator lacked testamentary capacity at the precise moment that
the contested will was  executed.”).
164. Robert L. Aldridge, Capacity, Competency, and Other Cans of Worms, 46
ADVOC. 9, 9 (2003).
165. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-407 (1990, as amended 2010) (“Proponents  of  
a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution . . . . Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of . . . capacity . . . .”).      In   a  
minority of states the proponent of a will must establish testamentary capacity without
the aid of a presumption. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 156.
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have the burden of persuading the court that the testator lacked the requisite
mental capacity.166
The age requirement’s  role  in aiding the court in establishing the testator’s  competency  corresponds  to  the  role  that  will-execution formalities play
in aiding the court in determining testamentary intent. In addition to assessing whether a decedent had the requisite mental capacity to exercise testamentary power, the probate court must determine whether the decedent
intended a particular document to be his will.167 Like the evidentiary difficulties   that   hinder   the   court’s   ability   to   evaluate   the   testator’s   competency, 168
certain   characteristics   of   the   probate   process   obstruct   the   court’s   ability   to  
determine testamentary intent. Because the probate process takes place after
the   decedent’s   death,   the   court   cannot   simply   ask   the   decedent   whether   he  
intended a particular document to be testamentary in nature.169 Likewise, the
long lag between the execution of a will and the commencement of the probate  process  may  also  hinder  the  court’s  ability  to  determine  whether  the  de-
cedent intended a particular document to be his will. As such, the probate
court’s  task  of  determining  testamentary  intent  may  prove  difficult.
These evidentiary difficulties are alleviated in part by the formalities of
will-execution, which require that a will be written, signed by the testator,
and attested by at least two witnesses.170 A  testator’s  compliance  with  these  
formalities aids the court in determining whether a decedent intended a particular document to constitute a will by serving as a proxy for testamentary
intent. By leaving behind a written, signed, and attested document, the testator strongly signals his desire to exercise testamentary power and provides the
probate court reliable evidence of testamentary intent.171 The decedent thus
leaves little doubt that he intended to execute a will.172
166. See ATKINSON, supra note 160,   at   547   (“The   presumption of sanity is . . .
founded  merely  on  mathematical  probabilities.”).
167. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS’
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 115  (7th  ed.  2006)  (“Probably  the  most  fundamental  requisite  
of a valid will is testamentary  intent.”);; John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American
Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521,  541  (1982)  (“A  valid  will  must . . . be executed with
testamentary  intent.”).
168. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
169. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 116, at 6.
170. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 202 (cautioning   that   “these   basic
requirements  for  execution  of  wills  vary  considerably  in  detail  from  state  to  state”).
171. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 17-20, 21-23, on file with author) (describing
the evidentiary and signaling functions of will formalities); Langbein, supra note 113,
at 492-94 (describing the evidentiary and channeling functions of will formalities).
172. See Langbein, supra note 113,  at  495  (“Compliance  with  the  Wills  Act  for-
malities for a witnessed will is meant to conclude the question of testamentary intent.
It is difficult to complete the ceremony and remain ignorant that one is making a
will.”).      Although   the   primary   purpose   of   requiring   testator   to   comply   with   the   for-
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Compliance with the prescribed formalities offers such strong evidence
of testamentary intent that when a duly executed will is submitted for probate,
a presumption of testamentary intent is triggered.173 Instead   of   the   will’s  
proponent offering independent evidence of testamentary intent, a contestant
of the will has the burden of persuading the court that the decedent did not
intend a written, signed, and attested document to constitute his will.174 Similar to the role that will-execution formalities play in aiding the court in determining testamentary intent, the age requirement for testamentary capacity
can be viewed as a proxy for the requisite level of mental competency that a
testator must possess to execute a will. Because the testamentary capacity
threshold   is   so   low,   a   testator’s   satisfaction   of   the   age   requirement   sends   a  
strong signal to the probate court that he possessed the necessary level of
mental competency to validly execute a will. In this way, the requirement
that a testator be of a certain age serves as a formality of will-execution that
facilitates  the  court’s  evaluation  of  the  testator’s  mental  capacity.
Mirroring the presumption of competency that applies to adults,175 the
probate  court’s  task  of  determining  the  mental  capacity  of  a  child  may  also  be  
facilitated  by  a  presumption  of  incompetency  that  is  triggered  by  the  child’s  
minority status. Under this view of the testamentary incapacity of minors, if
the age requirement is set at the appropriate level, children who do not satisfy
the requirement would likely fail to meet the mental competency threshold;
therefore, an individual determination of competency is not needed. Put differently, the law may view the age of majority as the tipping point at which
those above the specified age should be presumed to have satisfied the mental
capacity requirement because most testators of that age would meet the competency requirement. Likewise, testators below the specified age should be
presumed to lack the requisite level of mental competency because most testators of that age would fail to meet the competency requirement.176
This presumption of incompetency of minors corresponds with the presumption of competency of adults; however, the two presumptions differ in
one important respect. Whereas the presumption of competency of adults is
malities of will execution is to ensure evidence of testamentary intent, the requirement
may also serve other purposes. See Glover, supra note 142, at 431-40 (arguing that
will formalities serve a family protection function).
173. See Vickery v. Vickery, 170 So. 745, 746 (Fla. 1936) (explaining that a will
“should  be  presumed to have been made with testamentary intent when appearing to
have been executed with required legal formalities . . . .”);;  Langbein,  supra note 113,
at  500  (explaining  that  the  “fundamental  requisite[]”  of  “testamentary  intent  [is]  pre-
sumed from due execution . . . .”).
174. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 167, at 541-43; see also, e.g., In re
Watkins’  Estate,  198  P.  721  (Wash.  1921).
175. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
176. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 547,  559  (2000)  (“The  designation  of  a  categorical  legal  age  of  majority  can  
be  understood  as  reflecting  a  crude  judgment  about  maturity  and  competence.”).
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rebuttable by evidence that suggests that the adult was incompetent at the
time of will-execution,177 the presumption of incompetency of minors is conclusive.178 No  evidence  of  a  minor’s  competency  can  overcome  the  presump-
tion of incompetency.179
The conclusiveness of the presumption of incompetency is troublesome
because it is undoubtedly over-inclusive. The competency threshold for executing wills is relatively low when compared to the mental capacity requirements for giving lifetime gifts and entering contracts,180 and scholars recognize that many children satisfy the contractual and donative competency requirements.181 As such, all minors are denied the ability to execute wills despite that a large portion likely would meet the testamentary mental capacity
requirement. The distinction between the rebuttability of the presumption of
competency and the conclusiveness of the presumption of incompetency
could perhaps reflect the notion that the law should be overly cautious in
granting testamentary capacity to minors. However, as discussed previously,
the need to deny minors testamentary capacity in furtherance of protecting
them from imprudent testamentary decisions is questionable at best.182

B. Rebuttable Presumption of Incompetence
The incongruence between the ability to rebut the presumption of competency of adults and the inability to overcome the presumption of incompetency of minors suggests that the law should be reformed to allow courts to
make individual determinations of the competency of children. If a particular
state bases the testamentary incapacity of minors upon the rationale that the
age requirement serves as a proxy for competency, the categorical age requirement should be abolished and the presumption should be changed from a
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-407 (1990, as amended 2010).
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 141; see also, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 337
So. 2d 713, 715 (Miss. 1976) (finding that a decedent had the mental capacity required to execute a will but did not have the contractual mental capacity required to
execute a deed).
181. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing  the  Myth  of  the  “Infancy Law Doctrine”:   From   Incapacity   to   Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 515 (1994)
(“The   facts   bear   out   that   many   minors   are   not   the   incompetent,   lost   souls   of   years  
past.”);;   Rhonda   Gay   Hartman,   Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265,  1303  (2000)  (“[C]onclusive  incapacity  belies  the  reali-
ty of adolescent capability and market savvy . . . .”);; see also Scott, supra note 176, at
560   (“[O]ne   likely   effect   of   the   categorical   approach   is   that   minors   will   sometimes  
continue to be treated as legal children when they are competent to make decisions or
perform adult functions. For this reason, this approach has been challenged, sometimes successfully, on the ground that it deprives competent youths of the ability to
exercise  rights  and  privileges  that  adult  citizens  enjoy.”).
182. See supra Part III.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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conclusive presumption to a rebuttable presumption. This reform would ultimately further the overarching purpose of the law of wills, which is to effectuate  the  testator’s  intent.183 As  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  explains,  “Mi-
nor children cannot opt out of intestacy laws that do not accurately effectuate
their intent because they lack the legal   capacity   to   execute   wills.”184 If the
categorical age restriction were removed and the presumption of incapacity
were rebuttable by independent evidence of competency, minors would be
able to opt out of undesirable intestacy schemes and the law would uphold the
testamentary intent of a greater number of decedents.
Reform of this type would correspond nicely with reform in other areas
of the law of wills. For instance, recall the connection between the way in
which   the   decedent’s   age   serves   as   a   proxy   for competency and the way in
which the   decedent’s   formal   compliance   serves   as   a   proxy   for   testamentary  
intent. In addition to the similarities previously discussed, the inconsistency
between the rebuttabilty of the presumption of competency and the conclusiveness of the presumption of incompetency also parallels the way that the
presumption of testamentary intent operates. On one hand, a testator who
complies with the prescribed formalities of will-execution invokes a presumption of testamentary intent.185 As such, the challenger of the will must
establish that the testator did not intend the document to be his will.186 On the
other   hand,   a   decedent’s   failure   to   comply   with   the   prescribed   formalities  
invalidates the will, and the probate court will not entertain independent evidence that suggests the decedent intended the document to constitute a legally
effective will.187
A law reform movement is underway that advocates allowing probate
courts to consider independent evidence of testamentary intent.188
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §  10.1  (2003)  (“The  controlling  consideration  in  determining  the  meaning  
of  a  donative  document  is  the  donor’s  intention.”);;  Adam  J.  Hirsch,   The Problem of
the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV.  587,  632  (1989)  (“[C]ourts  traditionally  exalt  
freedom of testation and the fulfillment of testamentary intent as central to gratuitous
transfers policy.”).
184. Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 94 n.1 (Ill. 1996). Intestacy laws govern the
distribution of property of those who die without a will. See DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 60.
185. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
186. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 167, at 541-43 (discussing   the   “socalled  ‘sham  will’  cases”).
187. See In re Churchill’s  Estate,  103  A.  533,  535  (Pa.  1918)  (“The  decedent  may  
have thought he made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one
of his intention, but of what he actually did,  or  rather  what  he  failed  to  do.”);;  Lang-
bein, supra note 113,   at   489   (“[O]nce   a   formal   defect   is   found,   Anglo-American
courts  have  been  unanimous  in  concluding  that  the  attempted  will  fails.”).
188. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 233 (explaining the proposed reforms of the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless error rule); see also,
e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990, as amended 2010); John H. Langbein, Ex-
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This would allow the establishment of testamentary intent despite a decedent’s   failure   to   comply   with   the   prescribed   execution formalities.189
The reform movement suggests that probate courts should not evaluate a testator’s  compliance  with  the  prescribed formalities based upon the traditional
rule of strict compliance.190 Under strict compliance, courts are required to
invalidate a will for any formal defect, regardless of how much evidence suggests that the testator intended the document to constitute a legally effective
will.191 By operating in this way, the rule creates a conclusive presumption of
the  lack  of  testamentary  intent,  which  is  triggered  by  the  decedent’s  failure  to  
strictly comply.
The law reform movement argues that the presumption of the lack of
testamentary intent that is triggered by the lack of formal compliance should
be changed from a conclusive presumption to a rebuttable presumption.192
This change would be implemented by the adoption of the harmless error
rule, which would allow a proponent of a formally deficient will to establish
by independent evidence that the decedent intended the will to be legally
effective.193 In jurisdictions that have adopted the harmless error rule, a rebuttable presumption of testamentary intent is triggered when the testator
complies with the prescribed formalities, and a corresponding rebuttable presumption of the lack of testamentary intent is triggered when a decedent does
not comply with the prescribed formalities. In both instances, the presumption can be overcome by extrinsic evidence.194

cusing  Harmless  Errors  in  the  Execution  of  Wills:  A  Report  on  Australia’s  Tranquil  
Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors]; Langbein, supra note 113.
189. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990, as amended 2010)   (“Although   a  
document . . . was not executed in compliance with [the prescribed formalities], the
document . . . is treated as if it had been executed in compliance . . . if the proponent
of the document . . . establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document . . . to constitute . . . the  decedent’s  will . . . .”).
190. See id. § 2-503  cmt.  (“By  way  of  dispensing  power,  this  new  section  allows  
the probate court to excuse a harmless error in complying with the formal requirements for executing . . . a  will.”).
191. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 225 (“The traditional rule is that the
formalities required by the Wills Act must be complied with strictly, and almost any
mistake in execution will invalidate the will.”);; Langbein, supra note 113, at 489
(“The  most  minute  defect  in  formal  compliance  is  held  to  void  the  will,  no  matter  how  
abundant  the  evidence  that  the  defect  was  inconsequential.”).
192. See, e.g., Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 188.
193. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990, as amended 2010); see generally
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 188.
194. Compare Vickery v. Vickery, 170 So. 745 (Fla. 1936) (en banc) (allowing
the contestant of a formally compliant document to establish that the decedent did
not intend the document to constitute a legally effective will), with In re Estate of
Hall, 51 P.3d 1134 (Mont. 2002) (allowing the proponent of a formally defective
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This reform effort is rooted in the idea that implementation of the harmless error rule would  increase  the  law’s  fulfillment  of  testamentary   intent. 195
The movement points to the overarching goal of the law of wills, which is to
effectuate testamentary intent,196 and the purpose of will formalities, which is
to ensure that a will accurately and reliably reflects testamentary intent. 197
With these objectives in mind, proponents of reform argue that invalidating
wills for lack of formal compliance contravenes these goals when other evidence strongly suggests that the decedent intended to execute a will.198 Put
simply, proponents of reform suggest that, in circumstances where the decedent clearly intended to execute a will, the requirement of strict compliance
undermines both the purpose of will formalities and the overall goal of the
law of wills.
Similarly, if the age requirement to execute a will serves as a proxy for
competency, the denial of testamentary capacity to all minors is incongruent
with both the purpose of the age requirement and the overarching goal of the
law of wills. If the age requirement is seen as evidence of mental capacity
that aids the court in correctly assessing the competency of the decedent,
denying the court the ability to evaluate the competency of minors based upon all available evidence undermines the objective of the requirement. Likewise, categorically denying minors testamentary capacity undermines the
law’s  goal  of  effectuating  testamentary intent because the rule denies all minors the ability to execute wills – including those minors who clearly satisfy
the competency requirement. Reforming the testamentary capacity rules to
document to establish that the decedent intended the document to constitute a legally
effective will).
195. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
235,  243  (1996)  (“The  argument  for  simplifying  will  formalities  and  forgiving  ‘harm-
less  error’  in  execution  rests  on  the  premise  that  effectuating  testamentary  intent,  and  
thus  protecting  testamentary  freedom,  is  the  primary  goal  of  wills  law.”).
196. See supra note 183.
197. See In re Will   of   Ranney,   589   A.2d   1339,   1344   (N.J.  1991)   (“The   primary  
purpose of [will] formalities is to ensure that the document reflects the uncoerced
intent   of   the   testator.”);;   Langbein,   supra note 113 (“The   formalities   are   designed   to  
perform   functions   which   will   assure   that   [the   testator’s]   estate   really   is   distributed  
according  to  his  intention.”).
198. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 188 (“The  Wills Act is
meant  to  implement  the  decedent’s  intent;;  the  paradox  is  that  in  a  case  [that  applies  
the   rule   of   strict   compliance]   is   that   the   Wills   Act   defeats   that   intent.”);;   Langbein,  
supra note 113, at 491-92  (“The  first  principle  of  the  law  of  wills  is  freedom  of  testa-
tion. . . . A  tension  is  apparent  between  the  principle  of  ‘free  testation  and  the  stiff,  
formal’  requirements  of  the  Wills  Act.”);;  Emily  Sherwin,  Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and
Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 457 (2002)   (“[F]ormality rules for will
execution prevent mistakes about intent and provide a means for expressing intent.
At the same time, in significant number of cases they may frustrate not only an individual  testator’s  intent  but  also  the  principal  objective  of  the  law  of  wills.”).
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allow proponents of a will to establish that a minor testator possessed the
requisite mental capacity would therefore both align with the purpose of the
age requirement and bolster the overall goal of the law of wills.
In  sum,  a  testator’s  age  can  be  seen  as  a  proxy  for  the  requisite  mental  
capacity to execute a will. This view corresponds to the way that the testator’s  compliance  with  the  formalities  of  will-execution signals to the probate
court that the testator possessed testamentary intent. If a state bases its minor
incapacity rule upon this rationale, the categorical prohibition of minors to
execute wills should be abolished and the presumption of incompetency that
is   triggered   by   a   decedent’s   minority   status   should   be   reformed.      Because  
under this rationale the purpose of the age requirement is to aid the court in
evaluating  the  testator’s  competency, and because the overarching goal of the
law of wills is to effectuate testamentary intent, the presumption of incompetency for minors should be rebuttable rather than conclusive. This reform
falls in line with trends in other areas of the law of wills and ultimately furthers the overall objective of honoring testamentary intent.

V. INTESTACY AS FORCED PARENTAL INHERITANCE
Although the traditional explanation for the testamentary incapacity of
minors is that the age requirement protects those who have not sufficiently
matured from suffering the consequences of their imprudent testamentary
decisions,199 the requirement could be founded upon a different rationale.
This possibility stems in part from the inconsistency with which the law deploys this protective policy. While the law protects children by denying them
testamentary capacity, it grants disabled adults, who possess the mental capacity of minors, the ability to execute wills.200
Consider, for example, the execution of a will by Marvin Teel, who
functioned at the level of a ten- to twelve-year-old child as a result of a mental disability.201 Teel executed a will at the age of fifty-two that gave his entire estate to his half-cousin.202 Teel’s  brother  challenged  the validity of the
will by arguing that Teel did not possess the requisite mental competency to
validly exercise testamentary power.203 Although   Teel’s   will   would   have  
been invalid had he been only twelve years of age instead of merely possessing the mental capabilities of a twelve year old, the court validated his

199. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 8.2 reporter’s  note  3 (2003).
201. In re Estate of Teel, 483 P.2d 603, 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 603-04.
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will.204 The court thus acknowledged that a person with the mental capabilities of a minor can be competent to execute a will.205
In re Estate of Teel highlights  the  inconsistency  in  the  law’s  application
of the protective policy that is embedded into the rules of testamentary capacity. If the law protects minors by denying them testamentary capacity, it
seems that the law should also protect mentally disabled adults who possess
the mental capacity of minors by similarly preventing them from executing
wills. The Restatement (Third) of Property recognized this inconsistency
when it acknowledged that   “[t]he   age   requirement   .   .   .   can   be   .   .   .   underinclusive as compared with its purpose that only a person of mature judgment
can   execute   a   will.”206 This inconsistency suggests that at least part of the
rationale behind the testamentary incapacity of minors does not relate to the
traditional protective policy explanation.
Similar   inconsistency   in   the   law’s  testamentary capacity rules suggests
that the previously discussed alternative rationale does not adequately explain
the age requirement. Although the requirement could be seen as a proxy for
mental capacity that assists probate courts in evaluating a testator’s   compe-
tency,207 the law applies this evidentiary tool inconsistently. Whereas the
minimum age requirement might be explained as a cutoff point below which
a decedent likely would not possesses the requisite mental capacity to execute
a will,208 the law does not place a corresponding ceiling on the age of testators, as adults of any age can execute wills.209
Nonetheless, if there is a minimum age below which a child likely does
not possess the requisite mental capacity, there would also seem to be a maximum age over which an adult likely would not satisfy the competency requirement. In instances involving both minor testators and elderly testators, a
presumption of incapacity could aid the probate court in evaluating mental
competency. This inconsistency in the application of the age restriction suggests that, just as the age requirement might not be founded solely on a protective policy,210 the testamentary incapacity of minors cannot be fully explained as a proxy for competence.
As   such,   this   Article’s   third and final potential rationale for the testamentary  incapacity  of  minors  does  not  relate  to  a  minor  testator’s  competency  
204. Id. at 605.
205. Id. (“Considering  the  record  and  the  overall  findings,  we  are  of  the  opinion  

that  the  conclusion  that  the  decedent  ‘functioned  at  an  age  level  of  ten  to  twelve  years  
old’  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  finding  of  competency  as  a  testator.”).
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.2  reporter’s  note  3 (2003).
207. See supra Part IV.
208. See supra Part IV.
209. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010), Rose v. Foster,
288  P.2d  745,  747  (Okla.  1955)  (“It  has  been  held  many  times  that  advanced  age  .  .  .  
alone  does  not  render  one  incapable  of  making  a  will.”).
210. See supra Part III.

File:Glover – Final Edits

2014]

Created on: 6/11/2014 8:57:00 PM

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OF MINORS

Last Printed: 6/11/2014 8:59:00 PM

105

or maturity. Instead, this third possible justification explains the age requirement   as   a   mechanism   for   directing   a   child’s   estate   to his parents. By
denying minors testamentary capacity, the age requirement ensures that a
minor cannot pick a distributional scheme that reflects his testamentary preferences  and  thus  a  child’s  estate  is  likely  distributed  to  his  parents.211 In essence, the age requirement implements a scheme of forced parental inheritance,212 under which most children must direct their estates to their parents.

A. The Family as an Economic Unit
When a person who has not executed a will dies without a surviving
spouse or descendants, as most minor decedents likely do, the intestacy laws
in  most  states  distribute  the  bulk  of  the  child’s  estate  to  his  parents  to  the  ex-
clusion   of   the   decedent’s   siblings.213 Intuitively, this type of default estate
plan may reflect the desires of most children. However, empirical evidence
suggests that most adults without spouses or descendants would prefer that
siblings share in the distribution of their estates along with their parents.214
This suggests that part of the rationale for the default distributional scheme
detailed above is not the probable intent of the decedent.
Instead, the intestacy laws can be seen as reflecting an economic reality:
parents  contribute  to  their  child’s  ability  to  accumulate  wealth  through  finan-
cial and other types of support, and therefore parents deserve to inherit their
child’s  property  when  the  child  leaves  behind  no  spouse  or  children.    In  fact,  
one of the drafters of the Model Probate Code (a precursor to the UPC) explicitly endorsed this rationale when he explained  that  “[t]he  thought  behind  
211. See Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights:
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build
an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J.   537,   559   (2001)   (“Minor   children,  
usually children under eighteen, though they may earn money and own property,
do not have the legal capacity to make testamentary gifts. Since default intestate
succession schemes provide for the transfer of property to a decedent's parents if the
decedent has no surviving spouse or child, minor children’s estates are especially
likely to go to surviving parents. Thus, minor children do not have the option of disinheriting  their  parents.”).
212. See id. (“[W]hen  the  decedent  is  a  minor  child,  parents  may  also  be  the  bene-
ficiaries   of   a   form   of   forced   heirship.”);;   Paula   A.   Monopoli, “Deadbeat   Dads”:  
Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259 n.8 (1994)
(“Children  are  forced  to  leave  their  estates  to  their  parents  because  the  law  bars  them  
from opting out of the intestacy/default system by making a will,”  and  therefore  “in  
the  case  of  inheritance  from  children,  de  facto  forced  heirship  exists  in  this  country.”).
213. See STERK, LESLIE & DOBRIS, supra note 32, at 93.
214. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy
Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 189 (2006)
(citing Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public Attitudes About
Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States,
1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 324, 346).
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[distributing  an  unmarried  child’s  estate  exclusively  to  his  parents]  is  that  the  
estate of a minor is likely to have been derived from his parents or grandparents.”215 This explanation suggests that  a  child’s  estate  was  likely accumulated  through  gifts  from  ancestors,  but  the  rationale  also  holds  when  the  parents’  
duty   to   support   the   child   is   considered.     In   either   case,   the  parents’   right   of  
inheritance is based upon the notion that children are able to accumulate
wealth because  of  the  care  and  support  of  their  parents.    The  child’s  probable  
intent is irrelevant.
The  recognition  that  parents  contribute  to  their  children’s  accumulation  
of wealth through economic and other types of support is also found in a parent’s   right   to   a   child’s   income   during   the   child’s   minority. In most states,
parents  have  the  right  to  receive  their  children’s  earnings.216 The underlying
rationale   is  that   the   parents’   right   to   the  child’s  income  mirrors  the  parents’  
duty to support the child.217 The rule recognizes that the child has the ability
to  earn  income  because  of  his  parents’  support,  and  therefore  the  parents  have  
a   right   to   the   child’s   earnings.      As   one   California   appellate   court   explains,  
“[The   parent’s]   right   to   [his   children’s]   services   . . . rests upon the parental
duty of maintenance, and it is said to furnish some compensation to him for
his  own  services  rendered  to  the  child.”218
The age requirement for executing wills can be seen as an extension of
the idea that parents should share in their  child’s  income  because  they  helped
the child accumulate that income through their duty of support. Whereas the
parents’   right   to   their child’s   earnings   allows   parents   to   share   in   a   child’s  

215. William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1037, 1049 n.52 (1966).
216. See Jillian Benbow, Under  My  Roof:  Parents’  Rights  to  Children’s  Earnings,
16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71,  71   (2005)   (“The   earnings   of   a   minor   child   rarely  
‘belong’  to  the  child.    They  belong,  instead,  to  the  child’s  custodial  parent who claims
them. In most states, as at common law, gainful employment neither guarantees minor children the right to receive their earnings nor provides them with a cause of action  to  recover  the  earnings  their  parents  have  taken  from  them.”);;  Erica  Siegal, Note,
When Parental Interference Goes Too Far: The Need for Adequate Protection of
Child Entertainers and Athletes, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 430-31 (2000);
see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500(a) (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 1 of 2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot)
(“The  mother  of  an  unemancipated  minor  child,  and  the  father,  if  presumed  to  be  the  
father  .  .  .  are  equally  entitled  to  the  services  and  earnings  of  the  child.”).
217. See Benbow, supra note 216, at  74  (“At  first  blush,  all  this  sounds  like  slav-
ery.      The   rationale,   however,   is   that   the   parent’s   entitlement   to   a   child’s   earnings  
reciprocates   the   parent’s   support   obligation   toward   the   child.”);; see also Barrett v.
Riley, 42 Ill. App. 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1891)  (“The  father  is  entitled  to  the  wages  
and ordinary earnings of his minor son, upon the theory that during minority he is
under  obligations  to  take  care  of,  clothe  and  educate  the  son.”).
218. Wardrobe v. Miller, 200 P. 77, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) (quoting McGarr v.
Nat’l  &  Providence  Worsted  Mills,  53 A. 320, 321 (1902)).
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wealth during the minor’s   life,219 the age requirement for executing wills
enables  parents  to  share  in  a  child’s  wealth  upon  the  minor’s  death.    Intestacy  
laws  ensure  that  parents  reap  benefit  from  their  child’s  estate  in  the  absence  
of a will,220 and the age requirement bolsters the parents’  benefit  by  ensuring  
that the child cannot opt out of this default estate plan. In essence, the law
treats  minor  children  as  a  component  of  their  parents’  economic  unit  and  rec-
ognizes that, through various forms of support, parents contribute to their
children’s  ability  to  amass  wealth.
The idea that a family is a single economic unit and that family members  should  therefore  share  in  the  distribution  of  each  other’s  estates  is  found  
elsewhere in the law of succession. For example, in all states, when a spouse
dies  without  a  will,  the  surviving  spouse  receives  the  bulk  of  the  decedent’s  
estate.221 This intestate distribution is primarily explained as a reflection of
the  ordinary  decedent’s  probable  intent.222 However, a secondary consideration underlying this default estate plan is that spouses function as a single
economic unit and therefore each contributes to  the  other’s  ability  to  accumu-
late wealth.223 Based partially on this economic partnership theory of marriage, the law directs a substantial portion of the  predeceasing  spouse’s  intes-
tate estate to the surviving spouse.224 Thus, the intestate treatment of both
spouses and minor children reflects the notion that surviving family members
who assist the decedent in amassing wealth should share in the distribution of
the  decedent’s  estate.
Moreover,   just   as   the   law   restricts   minor   children’s   testamentary  
freedom   so   that   parents   share   in   a   child’s   estate   regardless   of   whether   the  
child  would  prefer  otherwise,  the  law  restricts  spouses’  testamentary  freedom.
A   surviving   spouse   shares   in   the   deceased   spouse’s   estate   regardless   of  
decedent’s   preferred   estate   plan.      Indeed,   in   addition   to   setting   a   spouse’s  
default estate plan to provide for a surviving spouse, the law also allows a
surviving spouse to take a  portion   of   a  deceased   spouse’s   estate   even   when  
the decedent executed a will and opted out of the default distributional
scheme of intestacy.225

See supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 73.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 64.   (“A   secondary   policy   of   the   intestacy   laws   is   family   protection – preserving the economic health of the family after death. With respect
to spouses, a related consideration is the recognition that marriage involves an
economic  partnership.”).
224. See id. at 63 (“Under  current  law  [in most states], the surviving spouse usually receives at least a one-half  share  of  the  decedent’s  estate.”).
225. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
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This mandatory heirship of surviving spouses is typically referred to as
the forced spousal share and is founded upon two rationales.226 The first is a
support theory, which requires a decedent to provide for a surviving spouse
based upon the policy that spouses should financially support each other during life as well as after death.227 Second is the economic partnership theory
of marriage.228 By requiring a deceased spouse to provide for a surviving
spouse regardless of whether the decedent dies without a will or has opted out
of the default distributional scheme of intestacy, the law reinforces the idea
that spouses  contribute   to   each  other’s  ability   to   accumulate  wealth.229 The
forced parental share that the law implements by denying minors the ability to
execute wills corresponds to this forced spousal share. Both forced spousal
inheritance and forced parental inheritance recognize that families operate as
single economic units and that the accumulation of wealth by one member is
aided by the support that the other family members provide.
In roughly a third of states, various exceptions to the testamentary incapacity of minors allow children to execute wills under certain circumstances.230 For example, in some states children who are granted orders of emancipation by a court are authorized to execute wills.231 In other states, children
who are married or who are members of the armed services are granted testamentary capacity.232 The recognition of these exceptions lends credence to
this forced parental inheritance theory because children who qualify for these
exceptions are no longer active members of the family economic unit. Indeed,  similar  exceptions  typically  apply  to  a  parent’s  right  to  a  child’s  income  
under  the  rationale  that,  when  a  parent’s  support  obligation  is  terminated  by  a  
child’s   emancipation,   the   corresponding   parental   right   to   a   child’s   income  
should also terminate.233 Therefore, in states in which a child is granted testamentary capacity when he is emancipated through court order, marriage, or
military service, the general testamentary incapacity rule seems at least partially founded upon the forced parental inheritance rationale.
226. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425.
227. See id.
228. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1990, as amended 2010)

(“[T]he  economic  rights  of  each  spouse  are  seen as deriving from an unspoken marital
bargain under which the partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits
of  the  marriage  .  .  .  .”).
229. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425.
230. See infra Table I.
231. See infra Table I (identifying eight states that provide an exception for
emancipated minors); see also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4e(1)(n)
(West, Westlaw through P.A.2014, No. 9, of the 2014 Reg. Sess., 97th Legislature)
(“A   minor   emancipated   by   operation   of   law   or   by   court   order   shall   be   considered  
to have the rights and responsibilities of an adult . . . for the purposes of . . . [t]he right
to  make  a  will.”).
232. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
233. Benbow, supra note 216, at 75-76.
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B. Limiting the Parental Share
Although this rationale could underlie the testamentary incapacity of
minors, the law need not necessarily deny all minors the ability to execute
wills in order to implement forced parental inheritance. Indeed, the exceptions that some states recognize for emancipated minors illustrate that a categorical age restriction on testamentary capacity can be over-inclusive. In
states that do not recognize exceptions for emancipated minors,234 the scheme
of forced parental inheritance is over-inclusive because parents who are no
longer subject to a duty to support their children benefit from forced inheritance.235 The recognition of the forced parental inheritance rationale therefore suggests that policymakers in states that do not grant testamentary capacity to emancipated minors should reexamine their testamentary capacity rules.
If they justify their denial of testamentary capacity on the forced parental
inheritance rationale, exceptions to the rule should be implemented so that
children   who   are   not   part   of   their   parents’   economic   unit   can   execute   wills  
and opt out of intestacy.
Recognizing exceptions for emancipated minors remedies one form of
over-inclusiveness, but the implementation of forced parental inheritance
though a categorical age restriction on testamentary capacity is over-inclusive
in at least two other ways. First, the categorical testamentary incapacity of
minors provides all parents with forced inheritance regardless of whether they
fulfill their duty to support their children.236 Because forced parental inheritance is justified as compensation for the parents’  duty of support,237 parents
who do not fulfill the duty should not reap the benefits. By implementing
forced parental inheritance through funneling  the  child’s  estate  into  intestacy,  
the law does not account for circumstances in which the parent does not support   the   child;;   therefore,   the   law   subjects   some   children’s   estates   to   forced  
parental inheritance in circumstances that are inappropriate.
Second, the testamentary incapacity of minors is over-inclusive because
it   provides   parents   the   entirety   of   their   children’s   estates   irrespective   of   the  
size of the estate.238 Most children do not amass large fortunes and their estates are likely smaller  than  their  parents’  support  obligation.    In  such  situa-
tions,  forced  inheritance  of  the  child’s  entire  estate  will   not  overcompensate  
234. See infra Table I.
235. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010) (making no

mention of an exception for emancipated minors).
236. Intestacy statutes do not distinguish between parents who fulfill their duty of
support and those who do not. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(2) (1990, as
amended 2010)   (providing   that   “if   there   is   no   surviving   descendant”   the   decedent’s  
estate  shall  flow  “to  the  decedent’s  parents  equally  if  both  survive,  or  to  the  surviving  
parent if only one survives . . . .”).
237. See supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
238. Intestacy laws do not place a limit on the amount that parents can receive
through intestacy. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(2).
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parents. Some children, however, do accumulate substantial wealth239 and
their estates can be significantly larger than  their  parents’  support  obligations.    
For these children, the implementation of forced parental inheritance is overinclusive because parents will reap a benefit that is greater than their reciprocal support obligation.
Although the implementation of forced parental inheritance through
the categorical incapacity of minors produces instances of over-inclusiveness,
state policymakers could implement such a scheme in a way that remedies
these problems. Specifically, lawmakers could allow minors to execute wills
but   provide   parents   a   forced   share   of   the   child’s   estate.      Under   this   regime  
of forced parental inheritance, parents who fulfill their support obligations
would   be   provided   a   specific   portion   of   their   children’s   estates   that   is  
sufficient to compensate them for that obligation.240 Children, however,
would be able to leave behind wills that evidence how they would prefer to
distribute their property upon death and the law would respect minor testators’   preferences   to   the   extent   their   estates are not consumed by the forced
parental share.
Therefore, if state policymakers justify the testamentary incapacity of
minors as the implementation of forced parental inheritance, the categorical
age restriction should be eliminated and forced parental inheritance should be
implemented   through   a   forced   parental   share   of   children’s   estates.      Such   a  
regime would provide children greater ability to exercise testamentary freedom. Moreover, it would remedy the over-inclusiveness problems produced
by the implementation of forced parental inheritance through a categorical
age registration. Only parents who fulfill their duty of support would be eligible for the forced share, and the share would be limited to an amount equal
to  the  parent’s  support  obligation.

VI. REFORMING THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OF MINORS
As previously discussed, three potential policy rationales could underlie
the testamentary incapacity of all minors. However, none adequately justify
the categorical age restriction. Regardless upon which policy objective the
rule is founded, state legislatures should consider reform of the testamentary
capacity rules. If policymakers want to pursue a particular policy objective,
they can do so by implementing changes that serve the particular policy and
also further the overall goal of the law of wills by narrowly restricting minors’  ability  to  execute  wills.
239. For example, in 2010 at the age of seventeen, Justin Bieber earned $53 million. See Amanda Massa, Justin Bieber Leads List of Celebrity 100 Newcomers,
FORBES (May 18, 2011, 10:00 a.m.), http://www.forbes.com/2011/05/16/celebrity100-11-newcomers-justin-bieber.html.
240. This forced parental share would operate similarly to the forced spousal share
that is already well established within the law of wills. See supra notes 138-139 and
accompanying text.
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A. Elimination of the Age Restriction
As discussed throughout this Article, one potential reform that policymakers should consider is the elimination of the testamentary age requirement. By removing this categorical restriction on testamentary capacity, such
a reform would serve the overarching objective of the law of wills, which is
to allow people to freely decide how their estates will be distributed. Although this reform would undermine the policy goals of the testamentary age
requirement, lawmakers could implement these policies in other ways that
place  fewer  limitations  on  minors’  testamentary  freedom.
First, if state policymakers view the testamentary incapacity of minors
as protecting children from their own indiscretion,241 the categorical age restriction should be eliminated outright. Wills are inherently revocable242 and,
as such, children can rethink their testamentary decisions as they mature. The
revocability of wills mirrors the protection that the law provides children in
the related contexts of contracts and lifetime gifts. To protect minors from
the consequences of irresponsible contractual and donative decisions, the law
allows children to disaffirm contracts and gifts.243 If children had the legal
capacity to execute wills, the inherent revocability of wills would similarly
protect minors from imprudent testamentary decisions. Because the revocability of wills already protects testators from poor testamentary choices, the
protection that the testamentary incapacity of minors provides is not needed
and the categorical age restrictions should be eliminated.244
Second, if state policymakers justify the testamentary incapacity of minors on the rationale that age serves as a proxy for competence,245 the categorical age restriction should be abolished because a large portion of minors
would satisfy the testamentary mental capacity requirement.246 Instead of
categorically denying children the ability to execute wills, the law could treat
a  child’s  minority  status  as  triggering  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  incapacity.    
Under such a presumption, the probate court would consider evidence that a
minor possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute a will. As such, the
law would presume that children lack the mental capacity to execute wills,
but this presumption could be overcome by extrinsic evidence. This rebuttable presumption of incapacity would maintain the rationale that age serves as

241. See supra Part III.
242. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 251.
243. See DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 10-11; see also supra

Part II.B.
244. See supra Part III. As discussed previously, if state policymakers view the
testamentary incapacity of minors as protecting the children of minors from disinheritance, lawmakers could implement such protection by giving children a forced share
of  their  minor  parents’  estates.    See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part IV.
246. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
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a proxy for competence, but it would also enable children who possess the
requisite level of mental competency to execute wills.
Finally, if state policymakers want to implement a scheme of forced parental inheritance,247 they should abandon the categorical age restriction and
should  instead  explicitly  provide  parents  a  forced  share  of  the  child’s  estate.    
Forced parental inheritance is justified as compensation for the parents’ duty
to support the child.248 The testamentary incapacity of minors implements
this  policy  by  forcing  the  child’s  estate  into  intestacy  and  consequently  direct-
ing   it   to   the   child’s   parents.249 However, such a scheme is over-inclusive
because it provides parents forced inheritance irrespective of whether they
fulfill their parental  duty  of   support  and  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  child’s  
estate.250 Instead of denying all children the ability to execute wills, state
policymakers could implement forced parental inheritance by allowing children to execute wills but requiring them to give a specified portion of their
estates to their parents. Such a scheme would further the overall policy of the
law of wills by allowing children to exercise some amount of testamentary
freedom, and would also implement forced parental inheritance in a more
tailored and transparent manner.
After an examination of its potential policy rationales, it becomes apparent that the categorical age restriction that denies all children testamentary
capacity should be abolished. The primary objective of the law of wills is to
allow people to freely decide how their property will be distributed upon
death.251 However, the law currently denies all minors this freedom of disposition.252 Although certain policy objectives could justify some restrictions
on  children’s testamentary freedom, no rationale adequately explains the absolute denial of their ability to execute wills. Moreover, lawmakers can pursue  the  rule’s  potential  policy  goals  through  other  means  that  are  less  restric-
tive   on   children’s   ability   to   exercise testamentary freedom.253 As such, the
categorical age restriction should be eliminated, and children should be granted the legal capacity to execute wills.

B. Parental Consent
Although the utility of the categorical age restriction is questionable,
state policymakers may be reluctant to abolish the testamentary age requirement outright. Indeed, policymakers may overvalue one or more of the
aforementioned policy objectives, or they may simply be hesitant to make
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part V.
See supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
See STERK, LESLIE & DOBRIS, supra note 32, at 93.
See supra notes 236-239 and accompanying text.
See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 883-85.
See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 320.
See infra Part VI.B.
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such a drastic change to a longstanding and widely accepted rule. Regardless
of the concerns that policymakers might have with the complete elimination
of the testamentary age restriction, a less drastic reform is available. This
alternative   would   allow   parents   to   consent   to   their   children’s   testamentary
capacity. Under this proposal, parental consent would authorize the child to
execute a will.
Parental consent would provide children a greater opportunity to execute
wills  but  would  not  undermine  the  policy  objectives  of  the  current  rule’s  three  
potential rationales. First, parental consent would serve as protection from
irresponsible testamentary decisions. Instead of protecting children from
their mistakes by denying them the ability to execute wills, parents would
evaluate the prudence of their children’s  wills. Parental review and consent
of   the   will   would   serve   as   a   check   against   the   minor   testator’s   indiscretion.    
Children  would  be  protected  by  their  parents’  judgment  as  to  the  appropriate-
ness of their testamentary decisions, but they would not be categorically denied the ability to execute wills.
Second,  parental  consent  would  serve  as  evidence  of  the  minor’s  mental  
competency. As discussed above, one potential rationale of the testamentary
incapacity of minors is that age serves as a proxy for competency and that
minors of a certain age necessarily lack the requisite mental capacity to exercise testamentary power.254 Age, however, is a rough proxy for competency.
Whatever age is chosen, some children below the specified age likely will
satisfy the mental competency requirement. As such, this Article argues that
the  presumption  of  incompetency  that  is  triggered  by  a  child’s  minority  status  
should be rebuttable.255 Some may argue that giving children the ability to
establish testamentary capacity would be an undue administrative burden
because the probate court would have to make individual determinations of
minor   testators’   mental   competency.256 A parental consent requirement
would  diminish  this  concern  because  the  child’s  parents  would  make the individual determination of competency. Under this reform, children would be
able to execute wills but the court would bear no additional administrative
burden.    Parental  consent  would  provide  such  strong  evidence  of  the  minor’s  
mental capacity that   no   individual   determination   of   the   child’s   competency  
would be required.
Finally, parental consent would act as a waiver of forced parental inheritance. The forced parental inheritance rationale is based on the idea that
parents should share in the minor  child’s  estate  because  the  child’s  accumula-
254. See supra Part IV.
255. See supra Part IV.
256. Similar administrative efficiency concerns have been used to justify the rule

of  strict  compliance,  which  courts  traditionally  use  to  evaluate  a  testator’s  compliance  
with the formalities of will-execution and which prevents courts from considering
evidence   other   than   the   testator’s   formal   compliance   when   determining   whether   the  
decedent intended the will to be legally effective. See Langbein, supra note 113, at
493-94  (explaining  the  “channeling  function”  of  will  formalities).
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tion  of  wealth  is  facilitated  by  the  parents’  care  and  support.257 The testamentary incapacity of minors implements this forced share because, in the absence   of   a   will,   a   minor   child’s   estate   typically   is   distributed   to   the   child’s  
parents.258 Nonetheless, if parents are willing to give up their forced inheritance, they should be able to do so.259 Allowing parents to voluntarily waive
their rights would not undermine the policy objective of the minor incapacity
rules because forced parental inheritance would still be in place for those
parents who want it. However, under this parental consent reform, minors
would have a greater opportunity to execute wills.
In sum, allowing parents to consent to the execution of wills by their
minor children would further the overall objective of the law of wills, which
is to allow people to freely decide how their estates will be distributed.260
Moreover, the reform would serve the policy objectives of the testamentary
incapacity of minors. First, parental consent would protect minor testators
from making poor decisions. Second, it would provide robust evidence of
the  minor  testator’s  mental  capacity.    Finally,  such  a  scheme  would  maintain  
forced parental inheritance for those parents who do not waive their
rights. Therefore, because the parental consent proposal is a less drastic departure from traditional law than the outright elimination of the testamentary age requirement, policymakers may be more amenable to implementing this reform.

VII. CONCLUSION
Minors lack testamentary capacity.261 As a result, children cannot dispose of their property through wills, regardless of whether they possess the
mental competency that is required of adult testators.262 Three policy rationales could justify this rule. First, the incapacity of minors could be a protec257. See supra Part V.
258. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
259. An heir already has the ability to disclaim the right to receive an inte-

state share. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 132. Allowing parents to give
minor children the option to disinherit them could be seen as simply an extension
of their ability to disclaim their intestate share altogether. Moreover, the waiver of
the  forced  parental  share  would  mirror  a  spouse’s  ability  to  elect  not  to  take  the  forced  
share. See id. at 451. The waiver of the forced parental share would also correspond  nicely  with  parents’  ability  to  relinquish  their  rights  to  their  children’s  earnings.    
See Benbow, supra note 216, at 75-76; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7504
(West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 3 of 2014 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot) (“The   parent,   whether   solvent   or  
insolvent, may relinquish to the child the right of controlling the child and receiving
the  child’s  earnings.”).
260. See supra note 4.
261. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (1990, as amended 2010).
262. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tive measure that shields children from the negative consequences of their
inexperience and immaturity.263 If children cannot execute wills, they cannot
make imprudent testamentary decisions. Second, the age requirement could
serve as a proxy for competence.264 Under  this  rationale,  the  testator’s  youth  
provides  evidence  of  the  testator’s  lack  of  mental  capacity  and  triggers  a  con-
clusive presumption of incompetency. Finally, the testamentary incapacity of
minors could be seen as a means by which to implement forced parental inheritance.265 Under this theory, the age limit requires a minor to die without a
will  in  order  to  force  the  child’s  estate  into  intestacy,  which  typically  results  
in  the  distribution  of  the  child’s  assets  to  his  parents.
Regardless of which theory is used to justify the testamentary age requirement, the rule conflicts with the cornerstone of the law of wills. The
primary objective of this area of law is to provide decedents expansive liberty
to dispose of their estates as they want.266 But by categorically denying children the ability to execute wills, the age requirement represents a broad restriction   on   this   freedom.      Because   of   testamentary   freedom’s   fundamental  
status, the law should limit this liberty only when compelling and coherent
policy considerations require. Moreover, a rule that restricts testamentary
freedom should be structured not only to fulfill important policy objectives
but also to limit testamentary freedom in the narrowest possible way. Yet,
none   of   the   age   requirement’s   potential   rationales   adequately   justify   the  
broad, categorical incapacity of minors.
Indeed, reform of the testamentary age requirement is needed so that it
restricts this freedom only when compelling policy considerations mandate.
For example, if a state considers its minor incapacity rule as furthering a protective policy, a reevaluation of the rule suggests that the minor incapacity
doctrine should be abolished.267 Whereas children may require protection in
the contexts of contracts and lifetime gifts, such a protective policy is not
needed under the unique circumstances of testamentary gift-giving. Alternatively, if a state views its minimum age requirement as a proxy for a certain
level of mental competency, a closer examination suggests that such a rule
should not be applied formalistically. In other words, if age serves as a proxy
for competency, all minors should not be precluded from executing wills;
instead, age should merely aid courts in exercising their discretion regarding
the   determination   of   the   testator’s   mental   capacity.268 Finally, if state policymakers desire a system of forced parental inheritance, they should consider
implementing   it   through   a   forced   share   of   the   minor’s   estate   rather   than  

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part V.
See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 883-85.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
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through a categorical age limitation on testamentary capacity.269 The implementation of forced parental inheritance through such a system would provide
parents the benefit of forced inheritance but would avoid the overinclusiveness produced by the categorical age restriction.
Although legal scholars have devoted much attention to the minor incapacity rules in other areas, especially contract law,270 the need for reform of
the minor incapacity doctrine in the law of wills has largely been overlooked.271 This is true despite that reform in this context fits nicely within the
larger reform movement in the law of wills, which over the last several decades has pushed for the relaxation of formalistic rules that undermine testamentary intent.272 Ultimately, the recognition of the need for reform highlights the prudence of diligently reexamining a variety of formalistic testamentary rules and illustrates that through such a reevaluation new avenues of
reform can be identified throughout the law of wills.

269. See supra Part V.
270. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 181; Daniel, supra note 63; Robert G. Edge,

Voidability   of   Minors’   Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern Economy, 1 GA.
L. REV. 205 (1967); W.D. Navin, Jr., The Contracts of Minors Viewed from the Perspective of Fair Exchange, 50 N.C. L. REV. 517 (1972); Victoria Slade, Note, The
Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 613 (2011).
271. Occasionally scholars suggest the need to reform the minor incapacity doctrine in the law of wills, which often relates to whether eighteen is the appropriate age
at which the law should remove the categorical incapacity of minors. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 321.
272. See generally James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009
(1992); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994).
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TABLE I273
State

Code Sections

Age

Exceptions

Ala.

ALA. CODE § 43-8-130

18

-

Alaska
Ariz.
Ark.

ALASKA STAT. Ann. § 13.12.501
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2501
Ark. Code Ann. § 28-25-101
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100(a)
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7050(e)(6)
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-501
CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 45a-250
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 201
D.C. CODE § 18-102

18
18
18

Emancipation
Marriage
Military Service
-

Cal.
Colo.
Conn.
Del.
D.C.
Fla.
Ga.
Haw.
Idaho
Ill.
Ind.
Iowa

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.501
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.01
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-10(a)
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-501
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-501
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1-201(15)
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-1
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-1
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.264
IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1

18
18
18
18
18
18

Emancipation
Marriage

14
18

-

18

Marriage

18
18

Military Service

18†

Marriage

18†

Emancipation
Marriage

Ky.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-601
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-108
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.020

La.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1476

16

Me.
Md.
Mass.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-501
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-101
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-501
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2501(1)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4e(1)(n)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4(1)-(2)

18
18
18

Kan.

Mich.

18

18

A minor under
16 may make a
will in favor of
his spouse or
children.
Emancipation
Marriage
Military Service

273. All statutes are current as of March 3, 2014 according to WestlawNEXT

online.
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Minn.
Miss.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-501
MISS. STAT. Ann. § 91-5-1

18
18

Mo.

MO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 474.310

18

Mont.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-521
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2326
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2209(26)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.085(2)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.090(2)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:1
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-1

18

Emancipation
Marriage
Military Service
-

18

Marriage

18

-

18
18

Neb.
Nev.
N.H.
N.J.

18
18
18†

-

18
18
18
18
18

S.D.
Tenn.

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 3-1.1
N.C. GEN STAT. Ann. § 31-1
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08-01
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-02
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.02
OKLA. STAT. tit. ANN. 84, § 41(A)
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.225
PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 2501
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-5-2
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(24)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-501
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-102

Marriage
Emancipation
Marriage
Military Service
-

Tex.

TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 57

18

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173

18

Marriage
Emancipation
Marriage
Marriage
Military Service
-

18†

-

N.M.
N.Y.
N.C.
N.D.
Ohio
Okla.
Or.
Pa.
R.I.
S.C.

Vt.
Va.
Wash.
W. Va.
Wis.
Wyo.
†  

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-501
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-201(14)

VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-47
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-333
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.010
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-2
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.01
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-101
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101

18

18†
18
18

18
18
18

Emancipation
Marriage
Military Service
-

18†

-

18

Indicates that the age requirement is not explicit but is instead tied to the age
of majority.

